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Abstract
In this article, we analyze the effect of a set of 12 macroprudential policies on the risk-taking of
banks using a large number of countries and banks. Our empirical results show that, although on
average these policies reduce risk-taking, the effects are quite heterogeneous and vary considerably
depending on the instrument implemented, market concentration, size of banks, liquidity, leverage
and different levels of risk. Structural policies, such as limits on asset concentration and interbank
exposures, are the most effective in terms of financial stability. Borrower based policies, such
as loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios, also have a positive effect on stability. Concentration
limits tend to be more effective for larger and more leveraged banks, while loan-to-value and debt-
to-income ratios are more effective in concentrated markets. We also show that there seems to
be a greater effect through the leverage channel for policies that are most effective in reducing
risk-taking.
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1. Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008/2009 demonstrated that the microprudential approach was insuf-
ficient to regulate financial systems since it did not take systemic risk into account. Over the last
few years, a series of macroprudential policies focus on limiting risk-taking, especially for the
larger and more interconnected banks that could generate systemic risk. However, there is a gap
in the literature because we know very little about the effects of these macroprudential policies on
risk-taking and the behavior of banks in general.
In this article we contribute to the literature by analyzing the effect of macroprudential policies
on bank risk-taking, using a large number of countries and banks. Our results show that the effects
are quite heterogeneous and vary considerably depending on the instruments implemented, bank
characteristics and market structures. However, the empirical results suggest that specific macro-
prudential measures are effective in reducing risk-taking of the more significant and more essential
banks in each country’s banking system.
Another contribution was to analyze a large number of macroprudential policies and to com-
pare the effects of the adoption of each of them on bank risk-taking. Our empirical results show
that although on average, the effects reduce the risk-taking, the impact of the measures varies
substantially. Structural policies, such as limits on asset concentration and interbank exposures,
are the most effective in terms of stability. Borrower based policies, such as loan-to-value and
debt-to-income ratios, also have a positive effect on stability. Concentration limits tend to be more
effective for bigger and more leveraged banks, while loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios are
more effective in concentrated markets. All structural and borrower-based policies appear to be
less effective for more stable banks, while capital based policies, such as countercyclical capital
requirements, capital surcharges on systematically essential banks, dynamic loan-loss provisions,
and leverage ratios, have mixed effects.
Asset-based policies, such as limits on domestic and foreign currency loans and reserve re-
quirements, are the least effective, especially for riskier banks. While reserve requirements produce
positive effects on stability when interacted with size, liquidity, and leverage, limits on domestic
and foreign currency loans have adverse effects on stability, especially for riskier banks.
We also study which channels explain the effect of macroprudential policies on risk-taking. By
decomposing the risk-taking measure (Z-score), we detect a more considerable effect through the
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leverage channel in most cases where macroprudential policies were effective in reducing systemic
risk or risk-taking. Thus, macroprudential policies limit bank leverage, reducing their exposure to
risk.
Our final contribution concerns the approach used to identify the causal relationship between
the adoption of macroprudential policies and the effects on risk-taking. Our approach relies on
nearest neighbor matching using propensity scores before estimating a system-GMM method to
account for the selection bias on the implementation of each policy and the presence of temporal
persistence in the Z-score measure. For each country that implemented the policy (treated), we
used propensity score matching to include a non-treated country using variables related to bank
characteristics and macroeconomic and institutional factors.
In assessing the effects of these macroprudential policies on bank risk-taking, this article re-
lates to recent literature, such as Bruno et al. (2017), Cerutti et al. (2017a), Akinci and Olmstead-
Rumsey (2018) and Altunbas et al. (2018). Our results corroborate the results for countries with
diverse institutional sets and financial markets, highlighting the main measures taken to mitigate
risk for most vulnerable banks.
We particularly study the effects of the implementation of a set of 12 MPs on the risk-taking of
banks of several countries and measure the heterogeneity of the effects under different prisms: con-
centration, size of banks, liquidity, leverage and different levels of risk. In addition to this primary
objective, we also seek to measure how the effect of the implementation of regulatory instruments
changes for different market structures and characteristics of the banking system especially about
variables such as concentration, size of banks, liquidity, and leverage. We evaluate which regu-
latory instruments are most effective for banks with excessive risk-taking. We also break down
the impact of MPs on risk-taking, in order to determine whether the effects of such policies are
due to an increase in bank returns or to a decrease in the volatility of these returns. We propose a
proper identification approach in order to measure the effects of the implementation of MPs from
cross-country data.
To carry out this study, we used a comprehensive accounting database of more than 15,000
banks in 45 different emerging and developed countries, with data ranging between 1995 and
2014. These data, obtained from the BankScope database (BVD-IBCA), contain all the informa-
tion needed to calculate concentration measures, liquidity, and financial stability, in addition to the
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accounting characteristics of the banks. The macroprudential policy database, developed by Cerutti
et al. (2017a) and built from the Global Macroprudential Policy Instruments (GMPI) survey con-
ducted during 2013/2014 and 2016/2017, was also used, as well as cross-country macroeconomic
and institutional data, obtained from the World Bank and the Heritage Foundation.
To measure the effects of MPs on the financial stability of banks we used a risk measure called
Z-score, which is a proxy for financial stability and is inversely proportional to the probability of
bank failure. The measures of liquidity, leverage, and size of the banks, as well as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman concentration index, were obtained through the accounting data. The use of these risk
and concentration measures are common in the literature (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010;
Fazio et al., 2015; Tabak et al., 2012).
In order to estimate and identify the effects of the implementation of the MPs, we first perform
a propensity score matching with the countries in our sample to account for possible selection bias
of the implementation of each policy. Then we estimate a system-GMM model, as formulated in
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), since the bank risk variable (Z-score) is
a measure that presents temporal persistence and whose lagged values are usually correlated with
the fixed effect in panels with short T and long N (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Lastly, we perform
the decomposition of the Z-score measure and add interactions to understand the mechanisms
through which the MPs affect the risk-taking of banks.
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. In Section 2 we present a brief literature
review and discuss our contribution. Section 3 discusses macroprudential policies and their defini-
tions. Section 5 presents an overview of the data used to perform our empirical exercise. Section 4
presents the methods and identification strategy. Section 6 presents and discusses empirical results
and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 rekindled the debate on how to regulate and supervise
banks and other financial institutions to ensure financial stability. Macroprudential policies (MPs)
regarding credit limits, capital reserves, and bank balance-sheet restrictions were part of the bank-
ing regulations discussed at Basel III (BIS, 2011). Both emerging and developed countries have
adopted these policies to mitigate the risk of transmission in the banking system and the high costs
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associated with adverse shocks to the real side of the economy (Borio, 2010; Claessens, 2015).
Before the global financial crisis (GFC), financial regulation of banks and other financial inter-
mediaries was strongly focused on instruments aimed at reducing the risk of individual bankruptcy,
not of the financial system as a whole. However, the bankruptcy of a large financial institution may
jeopardize the solvency of the entire system (systemic risk). Tabak et al. (2016) found evidence
that banking supervision is positively correlated with bank stability, thus contributing to mitigate
systemic risk.
According to Freixas et al. (2015), microprudential regulation that focused solely on the sol-
vency of financial institutions largely ignored the externalities of the financial sector and the real
sector for the entire macroeconomic cycle and, therefore, was not able to respond to the aggregate
dynamics of the interconnections of the banking system as a whole.
According to Brunnermeier et al. (2009), De Nicolo et al. (2012) and Cerutti et al. (2017a),
the main sources of banking risk that justify the implementation of MPs are externalities that
exist in the financial sector and market failures. These externalities can be associated with three
essential factors: i) vulnerabilities that may arise due to strategic interaction of banks during a
cycle of financial expansion; ii) deterioration of the accounting and collateral balance sheets due
to a general fall in asset prices in periods of financial contraction cycles; and iii) the propagation
of systemic shocks into the financial market due to its interconnectivity.
Therefore, a set of macroprudential policies was proposed to identify and minimize the risks
to systemic stability. The need to infer the effectiveness of such policies is thus one of the critical
challenges for policymakers and scholars. 1.
The works of Moreno (2011), Galati and Moessner (2013), Lim et al. (2011), Claessens et al.
(2013), Claessens (2015) and Freixas et al. (2015) summarize the main policies implemented by
both developing and developed countries, as well as their meanings and objectives towards miti-
gating systemic risk, arising from the procyclicality and interconnectivity between financial insti-
tutions.
In addition to this literature, whose objective was to present and describe the central macropru-
1In addition to the challenge of assessing the effectiveness of MPs, Altunbas et al. (2018) lists the challenge of
understanding the nature and objectives of the different instruments and the challenge of dealing with systemic risk,
which is generally endogenous.
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dential policies, there is increasing literature regarding the impact of macroprudential regulation
on the behavior of bank loans and financial stability. Here, one can separate this literature into
three broad groups. The first group includes studies called cross-countries. In one of these studies,
Lim et al. (2011) examined the links between macro-prudential policies and the development of
the credit market, as well as bank leverage. They found evidence suggesting that policies limiting
loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income ratios (DTI), in addition to policies establishing capital
reserve requirements and dynamic provisioning rules, are associated with reductions in credit and
leverage procyclicality. Tabak et al. (2017) found positive effects of more significant capital re-
serves of banks on profitability, although these effects proved to be negative in cases where banks
have excessive capital reserves.
Other cross-country studies include Claessens et al. (2013), who showed that the maximum
limits of LTV, DTI and maximum limits for loans in foreign currency were effective in reducing the
growth of bank leverage and asset prices; Zhang and Zoli (2016) who confirmed a high effect of the
LTV measure in containing growth in property prices, credit, and bank leverage; Aiyar et al. (2014)
and Gropp et al. (2018) who showed that in response to stricter capital requirements, regulated
banks reduced borrowing, while unregulated banks even increased their amount borrowed; and
lastly, Auer and Ongena (2016), who found that an additional capital requirement on real estate
loans led to growth in the commercial lending channel.
In addition to this empirical evidence, Cerutti et al. (2017a), using an IMF survey of 12 MPs in
119 countries between 2000 and 2013, found that it was generally the emerging countries that most
adopted such policies. Besides, policies such as DTI and LTV are associated with the decline in
credit growth, especially real estate lending. The authors also confirmed that MPs help in managing
the business cycle, but work less efficiently in recessive periods. Also noteworthy is the work of
Jime´nez et al. (2017), who investigated the impact of pro-cyclical banking regulation on lending to
companies 2.
The second group of studies focuses on investigating the effect of one or a few MPs, but for
specific countries. Among these studies we can highlight Igan and Kang (2011), who investigated
the effectiveness of only the LTV and DTI instruments in South Korea. Wong et al. (2011) also
2Other cross-country studies investigating the effectiveness of a set of MPs are Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey
(2018), Aysan et al. (2015), Cizel et al. (2016), Crowe et al. (2013), Bruno et al. (2017) and Cerutti et al. (2017b).
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used only LTV and DTI instruments, but investigated their effects on real estate credit and real
estate prices in Hong Kong. Camors et al. (2014) investigated the effect of capital withdrawal in
Uruguay in 2008, while Aiyar et al. (2014) confirmed a strong effect of capital requirement on
loans for UK banks.
In line with our objective, Altunbas et al. (2018) investigated the effectiveness of MPs in miti-
gating the risk behavior of banks. Their evidence suggested that MPs have a significant impact on
bank risk. Also, the authors also suggest that responses to changes in MPs differ between banks
and are highly dependent on their specific characteristics. We contribute to this article by mea-
suring the effectiveness of such policies on banks that are excessively risky, as well as develop an
identification approach to deal with selection bias.
Among the main theoretical studies, we highlight Begenau (2016), who developed a general
equilibrium model to analyze the effect of MPs on bank loans. Kashyap et al. (2014) presented
a general equilibrium model and showed the effects of the capital requirement measure on bank
risk. In this paper, the authors modify the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) bank run model. Lastly,
Elenev et al. (2018) elaborated a macroeconomic model to estimate and evaluate how MPs impose
restrictions on firms and bank leverage.
3. Macroprudential indicators
The database used to identify the adoption of macroprudential policies in different countries
came from a survey of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) called the Global Macroprudential
Policy Instruments (GMPI) conducted in 2013/2014 and 2016/2017. These data comprise a series
of more than 100 detailed questions on the adoption of 17 different MPs that were answered by
the central banks and monetary authorities of 140 IMF member countries. Cerutti et al. (2017a)
used this survey and verified the consistency of the responses with an earlier version for 2011,
in order to construct a database with binary indicators (dummy variables) on the use of 12 MPs
between 2000 and 2013 for 120 different countries. Later, the authors updated the database to
include observations from 2014 to 2017 and increased the list of countries to 160.
We combine the MPs database with banking and macroeconomic data for 1995 to 20003 for 45
3We need to use data for 1995 to 1999 for the calculation of the bank risk-taking measure known as Z -score, which
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countries selected based on data availability4.
The 12 MPs were classified as: (i) Countercyclical capital requirements (CTC); (ii) capital
surcharges on systematically important banks (SIFI); (iii) Dynamic loan-loss provisions (DP); (iv)
Leverage ratio (LEV); (v) Limits on domestic currency loans or credit growth limits (CG); (vi)
Foreign and/or countercyclical reserve requirements (RR REV); (vii) Limits on foreign currency
loans (FC); (viii) Caps on loan-to-value ratio (LTV CAP); (ix) Caps on debt-to-income ratio (DTI);
(x) Concentration limits (CONC); (ix) Limits on interbank exposure (INTER); and (xii) Tax on
financial institutions (TAX).
The instruments CTC, SIFI, DP, and LEV, rely on capital requirements, provisioning, and
surcharges. The first case refers to countercyclical capital requirements, which aim to ensure that
the capital requirements of the banking sector take into account the macroeconomic and financial
environment in which banks operate. Thus, this instrument aims to protect the banking sector
during periods of excess aggregate credit growth, which are usually associated with increased
systemic risk. On the other hand, in periods of credit restriction, capital requirements may be
lower, so as not to affect the performance of the real sector of the economy.
The second measure, SIFI, imposes a surcharge on the capital requirements for financial institu-
tions that are considered systematically important. Therefore, the requirements are more significant
for those banks that have greater importance in terms of systemic risk. This higher requirement
makes it possible to minimize the probability of bankruptcy or liquidity problems associated with
these banks5.
The third measure, DP, is similar to CTC in terms of the dynamics of the operation of the
instrument. However, it requires specific provisioning for defaults on loan agreements, allowing
the creation of a financial reserve in periods of economic growth which can be used to cover
defaults that occur in periods of recession6. The last capital-based measure is LEV, which prevents
banks from exceeding a fixed minimum leverage ratio.
will require a set of 5 initial annual observations. We discard these observations for the estimation of the final models,
as described in section 4.
4We describe the steps to obtain our final sample, as well as the description of bank and macroeconomic data in
section 5.
5Further details on the regulatory standards involving CTC and SIFI measures are available in BIS (2011).
6Further details on the implementation of the DP measure are available in Wezel et al. (2012).
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The instruments CG, FC, and RR REV, are asset-based and impose restrictions on financial
sector balance sheets, assets, and liabilities. CG calls for limits on domestic currency loans, while
FC limits foreign currency loans, reducing vulnerability to foreign-currency risks. Reserve re-
quirements (RR REV) are traditionally used in emerging countries, especially in Brazil, with the
objective of controlling the multiplication of money through the imposition of compulsory deposits
with the Central Bank of part of the demand deposits of financial institutions7.
The instruments LTV CAP and DTI are borrower-based and impose restrictions on the bor-
rower, instrument or activity. LTV CAP refers to a cap on the percentage of the value of an asset
that can be financed by a bank loan to ensure a minimum collateral value for a loan, usually set at
about 70% or 80%. The DTI ratio is an alternative instrument that imposes minimum levels on the
expected capacity of borrowers to pay their debts, to control excessive borrowing by banks8.
CONC and INTER are structural tools aimed at addressing vulnerabilities from interconnect-
edness and limiting contagion of the financial system. CONC limits the fraction of assets concen-
trated to a limited number of borrowers, while INTER limits the fraction of liabilities held by the
banking sector or by individual banks. The last instrument, TAX, imposes taxes on the revenue of
financial institutions in order to control credit growth, mitigate economic cycles or correct systemic
externalities.
Although other MPs may be in use in some countries other than those discussed in this paper,
an analysis of the effect of these 12 instruments on the risk attitude of banks provides a general
understanding of the leading MPs currently in use in both developed and emerging countries9.
4. Methods and identification strategy
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of each of the 12 MPs on bank stability individually.
The decision to implement a macroprudential policy is not a random one and depends on the
banking system characteristics, as well as the macroeconomic and institutional variables of each
country. This decision usually generates a self-selection bias because countries that have banks
with a higher probability of default will usually implement more MPs. In order to reduce this bias,
7A detailed study of the implementation and effects of compulsory reserves in Brazil are available in Glocker and
Towbin (2015).
8Morgan et al. (2015) study the implementation of these policies in detail for Asian countries.
9For a general summary on the implementation and operation of MPs we recommend Claessens (2015).
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we estimated our models in two stages. First, we performed a propensity score matching through
nearest neighbor, thus obtaining one similar matched country for each treated one. Second, we ran
a dynamic panel data regression with instruments (System-GMM) to estimate the effect of MPs on
bank stability taking into account the autoregressive nature of the Z-score, as well as the time and
fixed effects for individual banks.
The propensity score is the probability of a treatment being assigned conditional on observed
baseline characteristics. It allows the design and analysis of an observational (nonrandomized)
study so that it mimics the specific characteristics of a randomized controlled trial. Condition
on the propensity score, the distribution of observed baseline covariates will be similar between
treated and untreated subjects. In general, this method allows two countries to be compared, one in
the control group and the other in the treatment group, with very similar observable characteristics,
with the main factor that differentiates them is the implementation of the specific MP analyzed.
This method has the potential to reduce or eliminate possible confounding factors and allows the
estimation of the effect of each MP on bank risk-taking and stability.
We first estimate the probability of treatment (propensity scores) through a logit regression
for each MP. To perform these first stage regressions we used one observation for each country.
We take the mean of the accounting, macroeconomic and institutional variables across banks and
years10. The dependent variable of these regressions was a dummy that identifies countries where
the policy is under use in any year of the sample. After performing these regressions, we matched
each treated country with an untreated one with a similar propensity score using a nearest neigh-
bor algorithm. After these procedures done for each of the 12 MPs, we run the System-GMM
regressions with bank-level data for only treated and matched countries.
We used three different strategies for the matching according to the macroprudential policy:
i) CTC and SIFI were implemented only in 2013, so we were able to match countries based on
pretreatment variables (from 2000 to 2012), and then we perform a 1:1 matching without replace-
ment; ii) DP, DTI, LEV, CG, INTER, RR REV, FC, and TAX is implemented throughout the entire
period of analysis, so we used all years while performing the first stage regressions, and then per-
formed a 1:1 matching without replacement; iii) LTV CAP and CONC were the most implemented
10The variables used in the first stage regression are the same as the ones used in the final regressions. The descrip-
tion of the variables is in section 5
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policies, and since we had a limited number of untreated countries we used all years in the first
stage regressions and performed a 1:1 matching with replacement.
After the matching, we estimated dynamic panel regressions with instrumental variables (System-
GMM) to obtain the effects of the 12 MPs on bank stability and, through interactions, we also
evaluated how these effects change for variables such as the size of banks, liquidity, leverage, and
concentration. We also used dummies to identify banks with excessive risk (first quintile of the Z-
score) and higher stability (last quintile of the Z-score) interacting them with the treatment variable
in order to assess the heterogeneity of the effect of the MPs across different risk-taking quintiles.
Through this estimation, it was possible to identify which instruments had the most impact on
the excessively risky banks, which had a higher probability of bankruptcy and which affected the
systemic risk the most. Lastly, we also performed auxiliary estimates and robustness tests, which
included the decomposition of the risk measure known as Z-score, as well as specification tests for
the System-GMM model.
A fixed effect panel data model can have a significant correlation with the lagged dependent
variable, so we use a System-GMM model instead, as proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995).
With the inclusion of the instruments proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998), we reduce the endo-
geneity bias due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable in our regressions. This model
also allows the use of lagged variables as instruments for the bank characteristics that are consid-
ered endogenous or predetermined. In order to ensure a proper specification of the models and
reduce the problem of too many instruments (Roodman, 2009), we apply a principal component
analysis (PCA) on the instrument matrix. We use the PCA scores as instruments for the System-
GMM estimation, followingBontempi and Mammi (2012).
The risk-taking measure that we use as the dependent variable is the logarithm of the Z-score.
We calculate the Z-score using the following formula:
Z-scoreikt =
ROAikt + Equity Ratioikt
σikt(ROA)
, (1)
where ROAikt and Equity Ratioikt are the return on asset and equity over assets in period t for
bank i and country k, respectively; and σikt(ROA) is the standard deviation of the return on asset.
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Since we have annual data, the standard deviation of the return on asset is calculated through a
rolling window using the five prior observations, which is why the data for the period from 1995
to 1999 (used to calculate the standard deviation of ROA in 2000) is not present in the estimation
of the econometric models. This strategy for constructing the Z-score is similar to that adopted
by Delis et al. (2012) and recommended for annual data in Li and Malone (2016). The Z-score is
inversely proportional to a bank’s probability of bankruptcy and has the interpretation of a measure
of financial stability, or as the distance, a bank is from insolvency. Many studies in the literature
have used the Z-score as a risk measure (Mercieca et al., 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Houston
et al., 2010; Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Fazio et al., 2015).
Since we used rolling windows to calculate the Z-score, we expected it to present a highly
correlated structure. In order to remove this correlation, we included two lags of the dependent
variable in all models. For each MP we estimate eight different System-GMM models: i) one
baseline regression to evaluate the overall impact of the MP on bank stability; ii) four regressions
where we interacted the dummy of the MP with either the size of banks, the liquidity ratio, the
leverage ratio and the HHI loans concentration index, in order to assess how the effectiveness of
the MPs changes according to these variables; iii) one regression where we interacted dummies
that identified the excessively risky and higher stable banks with the MP, in order to assess the
heterogeneity of the effect across different risk-taking quintiles; iv) two regressions where we used
the baseline model but with the components of the Z-score as dependent variables, in order to
understand how the policies affected the Z-score of the banks. Our baseline regression has the
following specification:
ln(Z-score)ikt = αi + β1 ln(Z-score)ik,t−1 + β2 ln(Z-score)ik,t−2 + β3MPkt
+ Bank Controls′iktβ5 + Macro Controls
′
ktβ6 + εikt (2)
where the subscripts i, k and t refer to bank, country and year, respectively; ln(Z-score)ikt is a N ×1
vector of the logarithm of the bank Z-score, considering we have a total of N observations in our
sample; MPkt is a N × 1 vector with the dummy of the macroprudential policy; Bank Controls′ikt is
a N × p matrix with p control variables for the bank characteristics; Macro Controls′kt is a N × q
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matrix with q macroeconomic and institutional control variables for the countries in the sample;
αi and β j are the coefficients to be estimated; and εikt is the error term. Our four regressions with
interactions have the following base specification:
ln(Z-score)ikt = αi + β1 ln(Z-score)ik,t−1 + β2 ln(Z-score)ik,t−2 + β3MPkt
+ β4(MPkt · Xikt) + Bank Controls′iktβ5 + Macro Controls′ktβ6 + εikt (3)
where Xikt is a N×1 vector with the variable to be interacted with MPkt, either size, liquidity, lever-
age or concentration. The other variables are the same as in equation 2. Our quintile regressions
have the following specification:
ln(Z-score)ikt = αi + β1 ln(Z-score)ik,t−1 + β2 ln(Z-score)ik,t−2 + β3MPkt
+ β4(MPkt · Higher riskikt) + β5(MPkt · Higher stabilityikt) + β6Higher riskikt
+ β7Higher stabilityikt + Bank Controls
′
iktβ8 + Macro Controls
′
ktβ9 + εikt (4)
where Higher riskikt and Higher stabilityikt are dummies that identifies whether the bank has a Z-
score in the first or last quintile, respectively. We interacted these dummies with the dummy of the
macroprudential policy in order to investigate heterogeneity between different levels of risk-taking.
Finally, we also ran regressions with the same specification of equation 2 but with the com-
ponents of the Z-score as a dependent variable: the logarithm of the risk-adjusted return on assets
(ROA/σ(ROA)) and the logarithm of the risk-adjusted equity ratio (Equity Ratio/σ(ROA)). With
these regressions, we were able to understand how MPs affect the bank Z-scores. We also report
the Hansen test and the serial correlation tests of first and second order in each System-GMM
regression to ensure a proper specification of the instruments.
5. Data description
The database used in this article comprised a sample of 16,255 banks in 45 different coun-
tries, including commercial, cooperative and savings banks in emerging and developed countries.
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All accounting data used to calculate risk-taking, size, liquidity, leverage, concentration and other
specific characteristics of banks are from BankScope, a financial database distributed by the BVD-
IBCA. The data is converted into US dollars to ensure accounting uniformity across different coun-
tries. The information is annual and covers the period between 1995 and 2014. The first five years
are used only for the calculation of the risk measure known as Z-score, and the 2000 to 2014 data
are used to estimate the econometric models.
We added country-level data to the bank accounting data to reflect both the implementation of
macroprudential regulation policies discussed in the previous section and the macroeconomic and
institutional information. The macro-prudential policy database was obtained from Cerutti et al.
(2017a) through the Global Macroprudential Policy Instruments (GMPI) survey, from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2013/2014 and 2016/2017, while macroeconomic and institutional
data were obtained from the database of the World Bank and Heritage Foundation, respectively.
Initially, the BankScope database contained more than 20,000 commercial banks, cooperative
and savings banks from 201 different countries, while the Cerutti et al. (2017a) macroprudential
policy database included 160 countries. After merging the two databases and removing countries
without information on MPs, some filters and cutouts were used to eliminate outliers and countries
with few banks, guaranteeing a representative sample of the banks in the countries analyzed.
First, we removed the consolidated balance sheets of the banks with unconsolidated balance
sheets, in order to avoid duplication of observations in the data11. Banks with less than five balance
sheets were then removed, as well as countries with less than ten different banks. The first choice
is vital in order to ensure a sufficient number of observations to calculate the risk measure, Z-
score. We choose countries with at least ten banks to avoid that specific characteristic of a bank
could influence the results obtained for a particular country. Moreover, at the same time to select an
appropriate group of emerging and developed countries. Finally, we remove missing values, and all
of the accounting variables relevant to the study were winsorized at 1%, limiting the extreme values
represented by the 1% and 99% percentiles, in order to reduce the effects of possible spurious
11The option to work with the unconsolidated balance sheets avoided the possibility of data duplication (if a Bank
A owns a Bank B, the consolidated balance sheet reports the assets of both banks, requiring the identification and
removal of the unbound balance sheet of Bank B from the database). In cases where there was no unconsolidated
balance sheet, we use the consolidated balance sheets. This strategy follows the line of articles such as Micco et al.
(2007).
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outliers.
With these procedures, an unbalanced panel data sample was obtained, comprised of 16,255
banks in 45 countries. In addition to the dummy variables that describe the implementation of
MPs, which take value one after the implementation in a country in a given year, the econometric
models included different variables to control for specific characteristics of the banks related to
management and decision-making that could change over time. These variables include the log-
arithm of total assets (Size), the ratio of liquid assets to total assets (Liquid Ratio), the degree of
leverage, measured by the debt to equity ratio (Leverage), the ratio of bank deposits to total assets
(Deposit Ratio), an efficiency measure given by the ratio of total expenses to net bank loans (Cost
Ratio), and the ratio of total loans to total assets (Loan/Assets). The first three variables were also
interacted with the dummies of MPs to verify how their effect changed for banks with different
sizes, liquidity, and leverage.
We also use the following macroeconomic and institutional variables, which vary over time and
according to the country: GDP per capita growth; the ratio of total exports and imports to GDP;
the concentration of the loan banking market, measured by the HHI index; the aggregate ratio of
equity to assets; the aggregate ratio between loans and deposits; and the property rights index. The
purpose of using these variables was to control the temporal changes in the specific macroeconomic
and institutional characteristics of the countries in the dynamic panel models. The HHI index was
also interacted with the dummies of MPs to verify how their effect changed according to different
market structures.
Table 1 includes the descriptive statistics of the variables that we use in this study, including the
two components of the Z-score: the return on assets (ROA) and the equity ratio. Table 2 lists the
countries in our sample as well as the number of banks and MPs implemented in each country; the
mean values of the logarithm of the Z-score and its components by country; and the mean values
of the variables that we interact with the macroprudential dummies. Finally, Table 3 reports the
percentage of countries in this sample that implemented each of the MPs described in section 3
between 2000 and 2014.
We can see from Table 1 that the sample includes countries with different institutional levels
and stages of development. The property rights index, measured on a scale of 100, ranges from 0
to 95, while the annual GDP per capita growth of the countries varies between -14.79% to 16.23%.
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The use of winsorized accounting variables made it possible to reduce extreme values in equity,
liquidity, deposits, costs, and loan ratios. For a fair comparison of the accounting data, the mean
value of certain selected variables for each country can be visualized in Table 2.
The three countries with the most significant number of sampled banks were the United States,
Germany, and Russia, with China and Thailand standing out for having the largest banks on average
as measured by the logarithm of total assets. The logarithm of the Z-score is a measure inversely
proportional to the probability of bank failure, so a higher average value represents more bank sta-
bility in the country. Thus, countries such as Switzerland, Germany and the United Arab Emirates
have banks with the lowest probability of bankruptcy, while Latvia, Argentina, and Romania have
less stable banks.
Table 3 presents the percentage of implementation for each of the 12 MPs between 2000 and
2014, while Figure 1 refers to the number of countries that adopted each policy in at least one year
of the sample. The most adopted policies were the borrower concentration limits (CONC) and the
cap on loan-to-value ratio (LTV CAP). CONC was adopted by 45.45% of the sampled countries in
2000, increasing to more than 50% of adoption after 2001, while LTV CAP was adopted by almost
50% of the countries by the year 2014. Of the 45 countries, 37 and 22 countries implemented
CONC and LTV CAP in at least one year of the sample, respectively. Specific instruments, such
as CTC and SIFI, were adopted only in recent years, making it possible to compare and design
more adequate identification strategies, while other instruments were adopted by certain countries
over the entire period of analysis, allowing only a comparison with banks of other countries.
6. Results
Before estimating the regressions of equations 2, 3 and 4, we first performed the propensity
score matching for each MP in order to obtain a reduced sample of countries. Table 4 presents
the list of countries that implemented each MP and their respective untreated matched country
based on the estimations of the propensity scores and the algorithm of nearest neighbor discussed
in section 4.
Several MPs, such as INTER, LTV CAP, and DP, were implemented in many countries, whereas
others, such as CTC and CG, only in a limited number of countries. In all cases, we used the best-
matched country for each treated country. This strategy produces in having different matched
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countries for the same treated country depending on the MP implemented. For example, Spain
may be a better control country for China (SIFI), but since it is considered a treated country in
LTV CAP, the next available best match is Mexico. However, in the case of the LEV policy, Spain
is not used as a control for China. We follow this procedure because the matching also seeks to
predict the dependent variable as best as possible.
Figures 2 to 10 show the evolution of the logarithm of the Z-score for selected countries that
implemented the MPs in the middle of the sample (in red) and their respective untreated matched
country (in blue). As stated in section 4, we matched the countries with their nearest neighbor using
the propensity scores. The vertical line shows the year of implementation. We present the number
of countries that implemented each MP in Figure 1. In all cases, the common trends hypothesis
seems to hold as there is a parallel trend before the implementation of the policy. In our view, these
figures show that the quality of the matching procedure is relatively good.
In many cases, there was a similar trend for the Z-score for treated and matched countries
before the intervention. The changes in the trend after the intervention may give us a clue about
the effect of each MP, although we still need to control for the dynamics of the Z-score, fixed effects
of banks, and many possible observed characteristics of banks and countries which may change
over time. We do this in Tables 5 to 16, where we estimated the System-GMM models after the
matching for each of the 12 MPs.
Tables 5 to 16 present the eight different specifications of the System-GMM models for each
MP. In column one of each table, we show the results of the baseline model estimated through
equation 2. In columns two to five, we show the results of the regressions in equation 3, where
we interacted the MP dummy with the size of banks, the liquidity ratio, the leverage ratio, and
the HHI loans concentration index. In column six we show the results of the regression estimated
through equation 4, where we assessed the heterogeneous effects of the policies for different levels
of bank risk-taking. Finally, in columns seven and eight we estimated the same regression for
equation 2, but using the logarithm of the risk-adjusted return on assets and the logarithm of the
risk-adjusted equity ratio as dependent variables, respectively. The variable Xt in the second line
of the regressions refers to the variables interacted with the MP dummy, such as size, liquidity,
leverage, HHI, and the dummy that identifies banks in the first quintile of the Z-score (Higher
risk); the variables Yt−1 and Yt−2 refer to either the Z-score, the risk-adjusted ROA (in column 7) or
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the risk-adjusted Equity Ratio (in column eight).
The number of observations and banks in each table changes according to the number of treated
banks, since we performed propensity score matching before the estimation of the models for
each MP. We also report p-values of the Hansen and serial correlation tests. As we can see, all
regressions have the correct specification at the level of significance of 5% according to those
tests. We included year dummies in all regressions, but the coefficients of the year dummies and
the constant are not present in all tables due to space considerations.
The baseline regressions show a positive effect of structural and borrower based policies on
bank stability, such as: SIFI, LTV CAP, CONC, INTER (Tables 6, 12, 14, 15, respectively). When
we check for the heterogeneous effects of these policies, we observe that SIFI has a higher effect
for more liquid banks (column three of Table 6), that LTV CAP has a higher effect for banks with
more liquidity and leverage (columns three and four of Table 12), and that CONC has a higher
effect for larger and more leveraged banks (columns two and four of Table 14). All of these three
policies have a lower effect for more stable banks. We also find positive effects of DP for highly
leveraged banks (column four of Table 7), LEV for concentrated markets (column five of Table
8), and DTI for banks with more size, liquidity and leverage, and for more concentrated markets
(columns two, three, four and five of Table 13). DTI also show less effect for more stable banks
(column six of Table 13).
These results are in line with the evidence that loan-to-value or debt-to-income limits can be
useful in leaning against real estate booms, can help curb housing price growth (Hartmann, 2015;
Zhang and Zoli, 2016; Kuttner and Shim, 2016) and help reduce excess volatility in the economy
(Gelain et al., 2013).
Some of these policies, especially asset-based, show a significant negative effect on bank sta-
bility when considering the baseline regression, such as CG, RR REV and FC (Tables 9, 10, 11,
respectively). CG and FC have a more negative effect for banks with higher risk (column six of
Tables 9 and 11). Although CG seems to have a negative effect on stability for all cases, RR REV
and FC have a positive effect for larger and more leveraged banks (columns two and four of Tables
10 and 11). The policy based on revenue taxes only has a negative effect on stability for very con-
centrated markets (column five of Table 16). Finally, CTC (Table 5) seems to have no significant
effect on bank stability.
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Our evidence has some similarities with the findings of Altunbas et al. (2018), since there was
no significant effect of capital based policies on banking stability, such as CTC, DP, and LEV,
except SIFI. Popoyan et al. (2017) also found that minimum capital requirements and counter-
cyclical capital buffers are a practical regulatory framework, while Jime´nez et al. (2017) found that
dynamic provisioning smooths credit supply cycles and, in hard times, supports firm performance.
According to a survey conducted by Galati and Moessner (2018), many different studies found
some evidence of borrower-targeted macroprudential policies having some effects on intermediate
targets of these macroprudential policies, such as housing price growth and housing credit growth.
By contrast, empirical evidence on the effects of macroprudential capital flow management tools
is less conclusive and more mixed.
Similar to Brandao-Marques et al. (2018), we also ran the same regressions but with the com-
ponents of the Z-score as dependent variables in columns 7 and 8 of Tables 5 to 16. The two
components are the risk-adjusted return on assets and the risk-adjusted equity ratio. We use the
latter as a proxy for leverage. We can see that while SIFI, LTV CAP, RR REV, and FC mainly af-
fected the Z-score through the leverage channel, CG, CONC, and INTER also affected the Z-score
through the return on assets.
Our results show that policies that impose limits on domestic and foreign currency loans, such
as CG and FC, may hurt bank stability. Both types of policies hurt the equity ratio, which reflects
the fact that banks reduce their equity when their loan operations diminish. Limits on loans granted
domestically also seem to have a negative on the risk-return relation of banks, decreasing the risk-
adjusted return on assets.
On the other hand, essential tools that aim to address vulnerabilities from interconnectedness
and contagion of the financial system, such as CONC and INTER, have a positive effect on bank
stability, increasing the risk-return relation of banks and the risk-adjusted equity ratio. Specific
borrower-based instruments, such as LTV CAP, also have a positive effect on bank stability, pri-
marily through the leverage channel.
In tables 17 to 20 we grouped the MPs into four significant groups: capital based policies, such
as CTC, SIFI, DP and LEV; asset-based policies, such as CG, RR REV and FC; borrower-based
policies, such as LTV CAP and DTI; and structural policies, such as CONC and INTER. We then
performed the same regressions for those groups, using a dummy variable that equaled one if any
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of those policies are under use in the country. The dummy equals one whenever the policy is active.
The results support the findings of the previous regressions, since we found a positive and sig-
nificant effect of structurally based instruments on banking stability, while asset-based instruments
have a negative effect. We also found some evidence of a positive relationship between borrower
based instruments and bank stability, which, as exposed in table 12, may be due to the positive
effect of LTV CAP. Finally, capital-based policies seem to have mixed effects on risk-taking, since
CTC and LEV do not present significant effects, while SIFI and DP increase stability.
7. Conclusions
In this article, we studied the effects of the implementation of a set of 12 macroprudential
policies on the risk-taking of banks for several countries using an identification approach that
relied on a nearest neighbor matching with propensity scores and a system-GMM model. We
found that macroprudential policies have considerably heterogeneous effects depending on bank
characteristics and market structures. Variables such as concentration, size of banks, liquidity,
leverage and different levels of risk are essential to explain how macroprudential policies may
affect the risk-taking behavior of banks.
Our main results suggest that the most effective policies in terms of stability were structural-
based, such as limits on the concentration of assets and interbank exposure. Borrower-based poli-
cies, such as loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios, as well as capital surcharges on systemati-
cally important banks also have a positive effect on stability. The least effective policies seem to
be those that impose limits on domestic and foreign currency loans. They hurt stability, especially
for banks with excessive risk-taking.
There seem to be a more substantial effect through the leverage channel in most cases in which
macroprudential policies are effective in reducing risk-taking. The risk-return relation of a bank is
also essential to explain the negative effect of limits on domestic credit on bank stability.
This article adds to the literature that seeks to evaluate how different macroprudential policies
affect the risk-taking incentives of banks. Our results support the application of these policies
in countries with the most diverse institutional sets and financial market characteristics and also
highlights the main measures to be taken to mitigate risk to most vulnerable banks.
Macroprudential policies do generally not take the different institutional, macroeconomic and
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banking market characteristics of countries into account. Although some of those policies can sub-
stantially reduce the risk-taking of banks, they can also produce some unintended consequences.
Gurrea-Martı´nez and Remolina (2019) found that higher capital requirements may reduce access
to finance, especially in emerging markets, creating financial exclusion problems. It is essential
to highlight that macroprudential policies that reduce risk-taking may also decrease credit growth
and hamper economic growth. The opportunity cost of such policies may be a relevant topic for
future research.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the main accounting and macroeconomic variables
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Ln(Zscore) 3.3831 1.1233 0.4094 6.4180
ROA 0.0115 0.0293 -0.6212 3.4020
Equity Ratio 0.1043 0.0575 0.0247 0.4112
Size 12.9912 1.7273 5.9253 21.8631
Liquid Ratio 0.1399 0.1376 0.0107 0.7369
Leverage 11.0052 6.1933 1.4321 39.5555
Deposit Ratio 0.8201 0.1275 0.2630 0.9547
Cost Ratio 0.0546 0.0483 0.0113 0.3655
Loan/Assets 0.6221 0.1775 0.0773 0.9367
GDP per capita growth 1.2287 2.4777 -14.7863 16.2257
Trade/GDP 46.1057 34.3753 19.7981 382.2915
HHI Loans 0.0637 0.0507 0.0186 0.3209
Country Equity/Assets 0.0774 0.0235 -0.0793 0.2387
Country Loan/Deposits 1.1010 0.5105 0.2345 4.1706
Property Rights Index 79.6113 19.0952 0 95
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for the 16,255 sample banks,
including the 45 selected countries. The balance sheets are annual and
comprise the period from 2000 to 2014, and all monetary amounts are in US
dollars. Data were obtained from Bankscope (BVD-IBCA), the World Bank
and the Heritage Foundation. Further details on the calculation of the variables
can be obtained in section 4.
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Table 2: Mean values of selected variables by country
Countries No. of Ln(Zscore) ROA Equity Size Liquid Leverage HHI No. of
banks Ratio Ratio Loans MPs
ARGENTINA 79 2.082 0.022 0.181 12.947 0.263 6.892 0.084 5
AUSTRIA 251 3.373 0.007 0.086 13.591 0.239 14.053 0.129 4
BANGLADESH 31 2.541 0.023 0.079 13.539 0.167 15.085 0.070 4
BELGIUM 51 2.960 0.008 0.080 14.983 0.221 18.193 0.202 2
BRAZIL 150 2.273 0.023 0.167 14.059 0.305 7.938 0.103 5
BULGARIA 27 2.648 0.013 0.130 13.430 0.323 8.379 0.098 4
CHILE 36 3.155 0.017 0.147 14.556 0.210 8.744 0.119 7
CHINA 160 3.344 0.013 0.081 16.200 0.262 15.964 0.154 8
COLOMBIA 35 2.557 0.019 0.145 13.737 0.209 7.875 0.085 7
CROATIA 43 2.914 0.006 0.136 13.029 0.269 8.258 0.134 2
CZECH REPUBLIC 26 2.950 0.010 0.092 14.956 0.302 14.081 0.129 3
DENMARK 119 3.031 0.010 0.132 13.200 0.175 8.228 0.257 2
DOMINICAN REP. 62 2.838 0.021 0.174 11.199 0.224 6.773 0.207 3
EGYPT 28 3.038 0.014 0.098 14.767 0.335 11.460 0.145 0
FRANCE 328 3.558 0.010 0.093 15.364 0.254 14.212 0.078 3
GERMANY 1, 910 3.697 0.006 0.068 13.682 0.140 15.724 0.033 3
HUNGARY 33 2.532 0.007 0.105 14.244 0.295 11.155 0.110 4
INDIA 84 3.015 0.013 0.077 15.360 0.099 15.507 0.055 3
INDONESIA 77 2.758 0.021 0.129 13.903 0.280 9.145 0.076 3
ITALY 701 3.451 0.008 0.112 13.403 0.188 9.397 0.049 3
JAPAN 606 2.993 0.002 0.055 15.132 0.196 20.139 0.037 2
KAZAKHSTAN 30 2.371 0.021 0.171 13.647 0.276 6.969 0.143 3
KENYA 36 2.974 0.025 0.168 12.102 0.249 6.024 0.106 1
LATVIA 22 1.951 0.008 0.103 13.350 0.403 10.742 0.177 3
LEBANON 45 3.455 0.010 0.091 14.225 0.338 12.160 0.093 5
LUXEMBOURG 115 3.047 0.009 0.068 14.979 0.506 21.232 0.064 1
MEXICO 50 2.425 0.009 0.145 14.540 0.316 8.699 0.120 3
NORWAY 142 3.592 0.010 0.095 13.502 0.071 10.683 0.146 4
PANAMA 76 2.979 0.019 0.115 13.163 0.238 10.673 0.084 2
POLAND 55 2.796 0.013 0.112 14.590 0.188 9.995 0.090 3
ROMANIA 28 2.219 0.003 0.144 13.752 0.302 7.577 0.140 5
RUSSIA 900 3.094 0.022 0.196 11.559 0.308 5.811 0.138 1
SLOVAKIA 17 2.815 0.009 0.095 14.619 0.239 10.642 0.147 2
SLOVENIA 23 2.986 0.004 0.090 14.311 0.175 12.106 0.144 2
SPAIN 199 3.562 0.007 0.087 14.940 0.166 13.870 0.086 4
SWEDEN 100 3.283 0.014 0.139 12.910 0.137 7.902 0.239 4
SWITZERLAND 379 3.987 0.009 0.094 13.096 0.206 19.432 0.149 4
THAILAND 26 2.505 0.013 0.122 15.905 0.130 10.931 0.093 3
TUNISIA 16 3.277 0.011 0.107 14.162 0.229 10.703 0.107 2
UKRAINE 58 2.324 0.005 0.139 13.375 0.216 7.856 0.081 4
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 17 3.658 0.024 0.170 15.600 0.229 5.508 0.138 4
UNITED KINGDOM 113 3.024 0.008 0.144 14.317 0.415 10.318 0.152 1
UNITED STATES 8, 888 3.433 0.013 0.107 12.369 0.086 9.168 0.048 3
VENEZUELA 42 2.307 0.031 0.122 14.105 0.249 9.077 0.098 0
VIETNAM 41 3.235 0.014 0.116 14.097 0.305 10.406 0.159 3
TOTAL 16, 255 3.383 0.011 0.104 12.991 0.140 11.005 0.064 8
Note: This table shows the number of banks and the averages of the main variables by country, including all bank
balance sheets for the country from 2000 to 2014. Data were obtained from Bankscope (BVD-IBCA). Further
details on the calculation of the variables can be obtained in section 4.
28
Table 3: Macroprudential policy implementation percentages
Year CTC SIFI DP LEV CG RR REV FC LTV CAP DTI CONC INTER TAX
2000 0 0 4.55 4.55 2.27 11.36 6.82 9.09 6.82 45.45 15.91 9.09
2001 0 0 4.44 4.44 2.22 13.33 6.67 8.89 8.89 53.33 20 8.89
2002 0 0 4.44 4.44 2.22 13.33 6.67 8.89 8.89 55.56 20 8.89
2003 0 0 6.67 4.44 2.22 13.33 8.89 13.33 8.89 57.78 22.22 8.89
2004 0 0 8.89 4.44 4.44 13.33 13.33 20 13.33 57.78 22.22 8.89
2005 0 0 11.11 4.44 4.44 15.56 15.56 20 13.33 60 22.22 8.89
2006 0 0 11.11 4.44 4.44 15.56 15.56 20 13.33 62.22 22.22 8.89
2007 0 0 13.33 4.44 4.44 15.56 13.33 22.22 15.56 66.67 28.89 8.89
2008 0 0 13.33 6.67 4.44 13.33 13.33 22.22 15.56 68.89 28.89 11.11
2009 0 0 13.33 6.67 4.44 13.33 13.33 22.22 15.56 71.11 28.89 11.11
2010 0 0 15.56 6.67 4.44 13.33 15.56 28.89 22.22 73.33 31.11 15.56
2011 0 0 17.78 6.67 4.44 13.33 17.78 33.33 24.44 73.33 31.11 28.89
2012 0 0 17.78 8.89 6.67 13.33 17.78 35.56 24.44 73.33 33.33 28.89
2013 2.22 4.44 24.44 8.89 6.67 13.33 20 40 24.44 73.33 33.33 28.89
2014 4.44 8.89 26.67 6.67 6.67 13.64 20 48.89 24.44 82.22 42.22 26.67
Note: This table presents the percentage of countries that implemented each macroprudential policy
from 2000 to 2014. Data were obtained from Cerutti et al. (2017a).
Figure 1: Number of countries adopting each macroprudential policies
29
Table 4: List of countries that implemented each macroprudential policy and its nearest neighbor
CTC SIFI LEV CG
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
Norway Switzerland Switzerland Japan Chile Denmark Argentina Dominican
Sweden Denmark China Spain United States Sweden Bangladesh Russia
Bangladesh Thailand Switzerland Kazakhstan Vietnam Venezuela
Czech Rep. Vietnam China UK
DP RR REV FC DTI
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
Brazil Bangladesh Brazil Russia Brazil Bangladesh Chile Egypt
Spain Czech Rep. Kazakhstan Slovakia Colombia Russia Colombia Venezuela
China Argentina Lebanon Emirates Tunisia France Tunisia Thailand
Croatia Poland Ukraine Croatia Argentina Bulgaria Lebanon Switzerland
Bulgaria Sweden Vietnam China Dominican Poland China Ukraine
Colombia Venezuela Argentina Romania Ukraine Egypt Romania Sweden
Dominican Ukraine Bulgaria Panama Romania Mexico Kenya Russia
Chile Indonesia Indonesia Egypt Austria Kenya Hungary India
Thailand Slovakia Hungary Latvia Norway Latvia
Kazakhstan Tunisia China India Poland Indonesia
Mexico Italy Emirates Croatia
Vietnam Russia Kazakhstan Bulgaria
Panama Romania
INTER TAX LTV CAP CONC
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
Argentina Brazil Bangladesh Vietnam Austria United States All sample Kenya
Chile Bangladesh Belgium Dominican Chile Mexico except for: Kazakhstan
Colombia Ukraine Chile Czech Rep. Colombia France Egypt Slovakia
France Luxembourg Colombia Norway Spain Mexico Hungary Venezuela
Croatia Tunisia Sweden China Denmark Slovenia Kenya Hungary
Italy Kazakhstan Germany Egypt Thailand Mexico Kazakhstan
United States Russia Hungary Mexico Bangladesh UK Slovakia
Emirates Venezuela Austria Thailand China Mexico Tunisia
Mexico Indonesia France Switzerland Romania UK Venezuela
Romania Norway Latvia India Latvia United States Vietnam
Bulgaria Thailand Slovenia Luxembourg Lebanon Vietnam
Switzerland Egypt Slovakia Tunisia Hungary Venezuela
India Austria Ukraine Poland Norway Mexico
Germany UK Sweden Mexico
Lebanon Kenya India Mexico
China Czech Rep. Indonesia Vietnam
Spain Slovenia Emirates United States
Japan Latvia Brazil France
Poland Panama Czech Rep. Mexico
Note: This table presents the list of all countries that adopted each macroprudential policy and their respective
matched country with a similar propensity score based on the nearest neighbor algorithm without replacement. Since
we had a limited number of untreated countries in the sample for LTV CAP and CONC we performed a 1:1 matching
with replacement in those cases.
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Figure 2: CTC and SIFI Matching
Countries that implemented the macroprudential policy are in red and their match in blue. Norway and
Sweden implemented CTC while the other four countries implemented SIFI. The year of implementation is
in the vertical line, which we move by half a year before implementation to facilitate visualization.
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Figure 3: DP Matching
Countries that implemented the macroprudential policy are in red and their match in blue. In this graph, we
show six selected countries from the 13 that implemented DP. The year of implementation is in the vertical
line, which we move by half a year before implementation to facilitate visualization.
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Figure 4: LEV, CG and RR REV Matching
Countries that implemented the macroprudential policy are in red and their match in blue. Switzerland
and China implemented LEV, while Bangladesh and Vietnam implemented CG. We choose the other two
countries from those that implemented RR REV. The year of implementation is in the vertical line, which
we move by half a year before implementation to facilitate visualization.
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Figure 5: FC Matching
Countries that implemented the macroprudential policy are in red and their match in blue. In this graph, we
show six selected countries from the ten that implemented FC. The year of implementation is in the vertical
line, which we move by half a year before implementation to facilitate visualization.
34
Figure 6: LTV CAP Matching
Countries that implemented the macroprudential policy are in red and their match in blue. In this graph,
we show six selected countries from the 22 that implemented LTV CAP. We implement the matching with
replacement. The year of implementation is in the vertical line, which we move by half a year before
implementation to facilitate visualization.
35
Figure 7: DTI Matching
Countries that implemented the macroprudential policy are in red and their match in blue. In this graph, we
show six selected countries from the 12 that implemented DTI. The year of implementation is in the vertical
line, which we move by half a year before implementation to facilitate visualization.
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Figure 8: CONC Matching
Countries that implemented the macroprudential policy are in red and their match in blue. In this graph,
we show six selected countries from the 37 that implemented CONC. We implement the matching with
replacement. The year of implementation is in the vertical line, which we move by half a year before
implementation to facilitate visualization.
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Figure 9: INTER Matching
Countries that implemented the macroprudential policy are in red and their match in blue. In this graph,
we show six selected countries from the 19 that implemented INTER. The year of implementation is in the
vertical line, which we move by half a year before implementation to facilitate visualization.
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Figure 10: TAX Matching
Countries that implemented the macroprudential policy are in red and their match in blue. In this graph,
we show six selected countries from the 13 that implemented TAX. The year of implementation is in the
vertical line, which we move by half a year before implementation to facilitate visualization.
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Table 5: Impact of CTC on banking stability
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z-score) Z-score decomposition
Baseline Size Liquidity Leverage HHI Higher risk ROA Equity ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CTC 0.230 1.526 0.354 0.460 1.008* 0.041 -0.007 0.274
(0.239) (1.305) (0.346) (0.415) (0.524) (0.168) (0.087) (0.275)
CTC · Xt — -0.100 -1.445 -0.031 -5.093* 0.037 — —(0.089) (1.853) (0.034) (2.668) (0.138)
CTC · Higher stability — — — — — -0.247 — —(0.155)
Higher risk — — — — — -0.882*** — —(0.262)
Higher stability — — — — — 0.969*** — —(0.253)
Ln(Yt−1) 0.406 0.337 0.320 0.325 0.298 -0.021 0.349 0.244
(0.413) (0.373) (0.377) (0.376) (0.377) (0.307) (0.241) (0.388)
Ln(Yt−2) 0.196 0.149 0.139 0.145 0.160 0.146 0.299 0.219
(0.350) (0.342) (0.352) (0.347) (0.357) (0.252) (0.228) (0.317)
Size 0.420* 0.381** 0.400** 0.395** 0.404** 0.331* 0.173* 0.454**
(0.236) (0.165) (0.168) (0.167) (0.169) (0.175) (0.101) (0.224)
Liquid Ratio 3.829 3.104 4.043 3.549 4.367 1.091 -0.185 4.480
(4.781) (3.834) (4.086) (3.913) (4.203) (3.872) (1.606) (5.918)
Leverage -0.060*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.030* -0.016 -0.054***
(0.021) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.020)
Deposit Ratio -1.053 -0.071 -0.470 -0.160 -0.599 0.327 1.907 0.124
(2.728) (2.465) (2.590) (2.464) (2.588) (1.891) (1.386) (2.845)
Cost Ratio 5.131 2.077 -0.306 0.268 0.039 9.080 17.439 5.201
(12.674) (12.681) (13.475) (13.239) (13.888) (11.395) (12.752) (15.716)
Loan/Assets 9.668* 8.474** 9.238** 8.789** 9.576** 5.893 3.932** 9.800
(5.312) (3.545) (3.771) (3.578) (3.821) (4.134) (1.803) (6.137)
GDP per capita growth -0.045 -0.037 -0.041 -0.043 -0.032 -0.001 -0.037 -0.059
(0.052) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.037) (0.036) (0.028) (0.052)
Trade/GDP 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.022***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
HHI Loans 12.067 8.579 9.747 9.197 9.982 0.246 4.468 12.315
(9.187) (6.452) (6.759) (6.532) (6.835) (7.541) (4.314) (9.564)
Country Equity/Assets 33.014 27.701 30.344 29.931 28.801 2.388 23.086* 37.653
(25.128) (18.333) (18.730) (18.765) (18.280) (19.851) (11.813) (25.384)
Country Loan/Deposits -1.341 -1.197** -1.248** -1.246** -1.218** -0.673 -1.060** -1.494*
(0.819) (0.605) (0.617) (0.614) (0.604) (0.584) (0.442) (0.765)
Property Rights Index -0.073*** -0.068*** -0.070*** -0.068*** -0.072*** -0.035** -0.055*** -0.065***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.016)
Observations 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040
Number of banks 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675
Serial correlation AR(1) 0.439 0.417 0.430 0.424 0.491 0.271 0.327 0.489
Serial correlation AR(2) 0.375 0.499 0.487 0.491 0.453 0.310 0.118 0.268
Hansen test 0.145 0.105 0.164 0.138 0.177 0.289 0.109 0.190
Note: This table presents the results of the System-GMM model after matching countries through propensity
score estimates. ROA and Equity Ratio are risk adjusted and in logarithm. The coefficients of the year dummies
and the constant were omitted for space considerations. The values of the serial correlation and Hansen tests are
p-values. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Impact of SIFI on banking stability
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z-score) Z-score decomposition
Baseline Size Liquidity Leverage HHI Higher risk ROA Equity ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SIFI 0.218** 0.097 -0.208 -0.108 0.380* 0.252** -0.053 0.205**
(0.104) (0.684) (0.235) (0.145) (0.224) (0.123) (0.166) (0.081)
SIFI · Xt — 0.008 2.253** 0.014* -1.039 0.026 — —(0.044) (1.013) (0.008) (1.343) (0.138)
SIFI · Higher stability — — — — — -0.279*** — —(0.082)
Higher risk — — — — — -0.658*** — —(0.200)
Higher stability — — — — — 0.896*** — —(0.149)
Ln(Yt−1) 0.665*** 0.676*** 0.695*** 0.678*** 0.689*** 0.372** 0.875 0.850***
(0.193) (0.191) (0.220) (0.202) (0.196) (0.188) (0.637) (0.222)
Ln(Yt−2) 0.160 0.141 -0.052 0.117 0.159 0.149 -0.479 -0.020
(0.206) (0.212) (0.253) (0.230) (0.211) (0.263) (0.495) (0.207)
Size 0.030 0.026 0.073 0.027 0.035 0.021 -0.061 0.005
(0.084) (0.083) (0.078) (0.080) (0.085) (0.069) (0.164) (0.082)
Liquid Ratio -2.963 -2.943 -2.679 -4.119 -2.666 -0.850 -10.046 -1.891
(2.808) (2.805) (2.646) (2.608) (2.813) (3.436) (7.947) (2.372)
Leverage -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.068*** -0.057*** -0.063*** -0.034** 0.019 -0.050***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.019) (0.012)
Deposit Ratio 2.577 2.529 4.240** 1.343 2.967 1.784 -2.188 1.716
(2.554) (2.534) (2.070) (2.337) (2.658) (2.779) (4.191) (2.435)
Cost Ratio 12.745 11.961 7.397 6.891 15.015 11.064 -32.339 6.976
(12.831) (12.935) (12.171) (13.131) (13.258) (15.212) (21.922) (9.301)
Loan/Assets 2.591 2.637 2.857 2.099 2.800 1.885 -4.077 1.997
(2.023) (2.005) (1.942) (1.918) (2.022) (1.763) (4.056) (1.670)
GDP per capita growth -0.008 -0.008 0.013 -0.009 -0.009 -0.004 -0.013 -0.021*
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.032) (0.011)
Trade/GDP 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.012 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003)
HHI Loans 0.603 0.540 -0.847 0.614 0.687 2.250 2.636 0.538
(1.287) (1.271) (1.976) (1.383) (1.601) (1.587) (2.561) (1.182)
Country Equity/Assets -4.982 -5.033 -12.885*** -5.157 -4.546 -2.959 -14.313 -5.180
(4.582) (4.570) (4.727) (4.595) (4.758) (3.552) (9.296) (4.068)
Country Loan/Deposits -1.379*** -1.366*** -0.711 -1.353*** -1.436*** -0.521 0.753 -1.006***
(0.469) (0.471) (0.552) (0.478) (0.476) (0.457) (0.721) (0.387)
Property Rights Index 0.009 0.009 0.010* 0.005 0.010 0.010 -0.009 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.006)
Observations 9,710 9,710 9,710 9,710 9,710 9,710 9,710 9,710
Number of banks 1,273 1,273 1,273 1,273 1,273 1,273 1,273 1,273
Serial correlation AR(1) 0.0979 0.0886 0.0606 0.108 0.0960 0.198 0.207 0.0310
Serial correlation AR(2) 0.218 0.269 0.889 0.340 0.229 0.365 0.536 0.725
Hansen test 0.125 0.124 0.188 0.112 0.133 0.116 0.553 0.0921
Note: This table presents the results of the System-GMM model after matching countries through propensity score
estimates. ROA and Equity Ratio are risk adjusted and in logarithm. The coefficients of the year dummies and the
constant were omitted for space considerations. The values of the serial correlation and Hansen tests are p-values.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Impact of DP on banking stability
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z-score) Z-score decomposition
Baseline Size Liquidity Leverage HHI Higher risk ROA Equity ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DP 0.291* -2.955 0.809 -1.914*** 0.012 0.232** 0.053 0.086
(0.160) (2.114) (0.717) (0.479) (0.295) (0.111) (0.132) (0.186)
DP · Xt — 0.219 -2.668 0.205*** 1.613 0.026 — —(0.154) (3.040) (0.048) (2.527) (0.089)
DP · Higher stability — — — — — -0.081 — —(0.063)
Higher risk — — — — — -0.188 — —(0.288)
Higher stability — — — — — 0.486*** — —(0.153)
Ln(Yt−1) 1.422*** 0.817** 0.804** 0.606* 0.987** 0.814*** 1.639*** 1.019***
(0.378) (0.331) (0.406) (0.338) (0.441) (0.289) (0.536) (0.292)
Ln(Yt−2) -0.592* -0.005 0.081 0.112 -0.047 -0.134 -0.475 -0.341
(0.328) (0.305) (0.375) (0.283) (0.384) (0.223) (0.336) (0.241)
Size 0.062 0.079 0.153 0.129 0.153 0.025 0.023 -0.016
(0.145) (0.175) (0.164) (0.125) (0.178) (0.115) (0.073) (0.100)
Liquid Ratio -4.658*** -3.439*** -3.150** -1.542 -3.734*** -2.689** 0.420 -2.757
(1.682) (1.250) (1.398) (1.004) (1.377) (1.060) (1.181) (2.194)
Leverage -0.189*** -0.205*** -0.209*** -0.251*** -0.199*** -0.143*** 0.003 -0.120*
(0.040) (0.052) (0.057) (0.057) (0.061) (0.054) (0.027) (0.072)
Deposit Ratio -0.440 0.149 0.098 -0.373 0.237 0.073 -0.213 1.530
(1.434) (0.718) (0.783) (0.661) (0.900) (0.638) (1.314) (1.157)
Cost Ratio 1.198 0.953 1.007 0.474 1.511 1.392* -0.781 1.431*
(1.294) (1.170) (1.203) (0.998) (1.265) (0.844) (0.992) (0.831)
Loan/Assets -0.808 0.099 -0.147 0.449 0.050 -0.187 0.698 0.087
(1.909) (1.263) (1.364) (1.238) (1.531) (0.994) (1.279) (1.240)
GDP per capita growth 0.029*** 0.014 0.018** 0.002 0.020** 0.021*** -0.010 0.027
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.013) (0.017)
Trade/GDP 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 -0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.014)
HHI Loans -3.030** -2.780* -2.673* -3.125** -2.540 -3.371*** 0.972 -4.349***
(1.373) (1.469) (1.586) (1.312) (2.306) (0.956) (2.544) (0.772)
Country Equity/Assets -10.608*** -9.407*** -10.636*** -8.690*** -9.540*** -9.595*** 1.982 -7.191***
(2.235) (2.590) (2.898) (2.385) (3.022) (1.686) (2.858) (2.364)
Country Loan/Deposits 0.010 -0.008 0.015 -0.112* 0.028 0.016 0.032 0.055
(0.085) (0.078) (0.075) (0.060) (0.077) (0.053) (0.098) (0.059)
Property Rights Index -0.007* -0.007 -0.009* -0.005 -0.008 -0.003 -0.005* 0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 16,682 16,682 16,682 16,682 16,682 16,682 16,682 16,682
Number of banks 2,776 2,776 2,776 2,776 2,776 2,776 2,776 2,776
Serial correlation AR(1) 0.00712 0.149 0.298 0.336 0.207 0.0470 0.0354 0.00951
Serial correlation AR(2) 0.403 0.462 0.360 0.264 0.573 0.783 0.239 0.441
Hansen test 0.119 0.300 0.239 0.120 0.256 0.0758 0.0567 0.0568
Note: This table presents the results of the System-GMM model after matching countries through propensity score
estimates. ROA and Equity Ratio are risk adjusted and in logarithm. The coefficients of the year dummies and the
constant were omitted for space considerations. The values of the serial correlation and Hansen tests are p-values.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Impact of LEV on banking stability
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z-score) Z-score decomposition
Baseline Size Liquidity Leverage HHI Higher risk ROA Equity ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LEV 0.334 -32.300 0.295 -0.460 -4.972*** 0.249 -0.064 -0.151
(0.320) (35.812) (1.366) (0.576) (1.225) (0.280) (0.118) (0.113)
LEV · Xt — 2.221 0.578 0.037 32.206*** 0.088 — —(2.519) (5.945) (0.045) (7.766) (0.144)
LEV · Higher stability — — — — — -0.148 — —(0.305)
Higher risk — — — — — -0.751*** — —(0.259)
Higher stability — — — — — 0.687** — —(0.329)
Ln(Yt−1) 0.849 0.979 0.966** 0.687 0.057 0.709 1.066*** 0.486**
(0.542) (0.818) (0.440) (0.516) (0.291) (0.463) (0.237) (0.234)
Ln(Yt−2) -0.273 -0.002 -0.444 0.132 0.358 -0.372 -0.308 0.127
(0.724) (0.639) (0.572) (0.590) (0.334) (0.578) (0.235) (0.235)
Size -0.348 -2.478 -0.351 -0.484 0.103 -0.340* -0.129* -0.014
(0.242) (2.763) (0.299) (0.336) (0.140) (0.205) (0.078) (0.104)
Liquid Ratio -11.152*** -5.541 -11.357* -12.044*** -10.672*** -8.482*** -3.528 -5.277***
(4.248) (6.693) (6.669) (4.251) (2.753) (3.246) (2.207) (1.692)
Leverage -0.018 0.095 -0.041 0.072 -0.079** 0.018 0.006 -0.037
(0.103) (0.189) (0.110) (0.086) (0.040) (0.081) (0.024) (0.024)
Deposit Ratio -4.164 -20.106 -2.336 -12.176 -0.885 -4.952 -3.196 -3.910
(12.161) (26.288) (12.590) (11.100) (5.809) (9.638) (3.630) (3.575)
Cost Ratio -0.718 -27.008 -1.538 0.823 5.609 -2.620 2.593 9.484
(13.016) (28.312) (14.200) (13.925) (10.024) (10.359) (7.575) (9.231)
Loan/Assets -12.098** -3.876 -13.319** -9.951* -5.849** -9.658* -4.292** -4.838**
(6.126) (6.858) (5.258) (5.281) (2.954) (5.083) (2.123) (2.127)
GDP per capita growth -0.068** 0.161 -0.063* -0.086** 0.002 -0.042 0.024 0.027
(0.034) (0.289) (0.033) (0.036) (0.026) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028)
Trade/GDP 0.025 0.001 0.032 -0.006 0.032** 0.018 -0.002 0.004
(0.035) (0.050) (0.035) (0.030) (0.015) (0.028) (0.010) (0.010)
HHI Loans 10.818 -18.121 9.419 20.329* -31.004*** 6.220 0.306 -4.865
(8.949) (29.232) (12.637) (12.122) (7.610) (8.113) (4.267) (4.396)
Country Equity/Assets 19.566 40.909 18.888 29.868* -7.766** 11.538 -8.913 -19.331***
(12.189) (48.079) (17.853) (16.948) (3.835) (11.093) (7.391) (6.717)
Country Loan/Deposits -2.713* 1.693 -2.787* -2.989* 0.629 -1.811 -0.463 -0.304
(1.487) (5.143) (1.686) (1.615) (0.759) (1.199) (0.605) (0.715)
Property Rights Index -0.004 -0.063 -0.001 -0.010 0.014 -0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.017) (0.070) (0.017) (0.015) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011)
Observations 66,279 66,279 66,279 66,279 66,279 66,279 66,279 66,279
Number of banks 8,850 8,850 8,850 8,850 8,850 8,850 8,850 8,850
Serial correlation AR(1) 0.375 0.424 0.183 0.469 0.841 0.260 0.00513 0.263
Serial correlation AR(2) 0.899 0.690 0.645 0.472 0.141 0.708 0.418 0.311
Hansen test 0.195 0.246 0.223 0.107 0.503 0.241 0.153 0.0847
Note: This table presents the results of the System-GMM model after matching countries through propensity score
estimates. ROA and Equity Ratio are risk adjusted and in logarithm. The coefficients of the year dummies and the
constant were omitted for space considerations. The values of the serial correlation and Hansen tests are p-values.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Impact of CG on banking stability
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z-score) Z-score decomposition
Baseline Size Liquidity Leverage HHI Higher risk ROA Equity ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CG -0.852** -2.306* -1.218 -1.549** -1.474* -0.538** -0.313** -1.130**
(0.434) (1.358) (1.159) (0.624) (0.880) (0.236) (0.155) (0.483)
CG · Xt — 0.109 1.321 0.071* 7.345 -0.187** — —(0.098) (4.129) (0.040) (6.663) (0.083)
CG · Higher stability — — — — — -0.020 — —(0.075)
Higher risk — — — — — -0.794*** — —(0.106)
Higher stability — — — — — 0.858*** — —(0.084)
Ln(Yt−1) 0.578* 0.581* 0.564* 0.540* 0.526 0.235 1.149*** 0.539*
(0.316) (0.311) (0.303) (0.301) (0.324) (0.162) (0.124) (0.297)
Ln(Yt−2) -0.184 -0.210 -0.162 -0.193 -0.156 -0.018 -0.275** -0.147
(0.226) (0.226) (0.231) (0.220) (0.223) (0.109) (0.108) (0.174)
Size -0.020 -0.021 -0.017 -0.019 -0.018 0.004 0.026 0.003
(0.063) (0.062) (0.064) (0.062) (0.061) (0.033) (0.029) (0.062)
Liquid Ratio -3.492* -3.273* -3.832* -3.321* -3.371* -1.415 -1.165* -3.761*
(2.050) (1.955) (2.222) (2.015) (1.999) (1.151) (0.610) (1.934)
Leverage -0.149*** -0.147*** -0.150*** -0.157*** -0.149*** -0.068*** -0.023** -0.159***
(0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.025) (0.010) (0.049)
Deposit Ratio 1.721 1.757 1.828 1.903 1.773 0.420 0.576 1.984
(1.386) (1.409) (1.367) (1.353) (1.370) (0.668) (0.555) (1.306)
Cost Ratio 3.145* 3.212* 3.252* 2.606 3.183* 1.709** 0.243 3.005*
(1.679) (1.679) (1.691) (1.812) (1.656) (0.841) (0.684) (1.599)
Loan/Assets -1.351 -1.232 -1.406 -1.199 -1.147 -0.547 -1.564** -1.741
(1.879) (1.848) (1.905) (1.919) (1.880) (0.959) (0.645) (1.748)
GDP per capita growth 0.023 0.022 0.026* 0.016 0.025* 0.017** 0.006 0.024*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.014)
Trade/GDP 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.006*** -0.000 0.005**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
HHI Loans -7.773 -7.548 -8.495 -8.941* -7.859 -3.628 -1.481 -11.030**
(5.165) (5.148) (5.170) (4.968) (4.927) (2.702) (1.737) (5.473)
Country Equity/Assets -11.709*** -11.600*** -12.475*** -10.068*** -12.015*** -6.883*** -4.625*** -12.992***
(4.115) (4.155) (4.551) (3.662) (4.047) (2.195) (1.463) (4.445)
Country Loan/Deposits 0.063 0.068 0.074 0.074 0.054 0.065 0.065 0.077
(0.113) (0.112) (0.109) (0.114) (0.111) (0.056) (0.051) (0.111)
Property Rights Index -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.010
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012)
Observations 5,758 5,758 5,758 5,758 5,758 5,758 5,758 5,758
Number of banks 1,091 1,091 1,091 1,091 1,091 1,091 1,091 1,091
Serial correlation AR(1) 0.0795 0.0720 0.0694 0.0788 0.103 0.00422 3.84e-07 0.0491
Serial correlation AR(2) 0.805 0.722 0.858 0.736 0.886 0.508 0.0623 0.697
Hansen test 0.138 0.119 0.107 0.118 0.127 0.0580 0.0926 0.201
Note: This table presents the results of the System-GMM model after matching countries through propensity score
estimates. ROA and Equity Ratio are risk adjusted and in logarithm. The coefficients of the year dummies and the
constant were omitted for space considerations. The values of the serial correlation and Hansen tests are p-values.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Impact of RR REV on banking stability
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z-score) Z-score decomposition
Baseline Size Liquidity Leverage HHI Higher risk ROA Equity ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RR REV -0.583*** -11.802** -1.281*** -2.089*** -1.400** -0.500*** 0.052 -0.564***
(0.170) (5.330) (0.355) (0.508) (0.566) (0.073) (0.095) (0.148)
RR REV · Xt — 0.790** 2.765** 0.167*** 7.827* -0.102 — —(0.379) (1.267) (0.060) (4.282) (0.073)
RR REV · Higher stability — — — — — -0.033 — —(0.060)
Higher risk — — — — — -1.037*** — —(0.156)
Higher stability — — — — — 0.996*** — —(0.115)
Ln(Yt−1) 0.608 0.939* 0.615 0.828 0.686 0.117 1.427*** 0.486
(0.428) (0.547) (0.595) (0.586) (0.459) (0.243) (0.309) (0.410)
Ln(Yt−2) -0.238 -0.575 -0.145 -0.421 -0.425 -0.061 -0.284 -0.076
(0.373) (0.436) (0.399) (0.481) (0.383) (0.211) (0.200) (0.356)
Size -0.042 -0.190 -0.041 -0.077 -0.123 -0.056 0.078 0.056
(0.138) (0.183) (0.156) (0.165) (0.136) (0.075) (0.072) (0.133)
Liquid Ratio -1.735 -1.191 -1.659 -1.689 -1.070 -1.174 -0.237 -1.765
(1.879) (2.301) (2.533) (2.250) (2.007) (0.907) (0.842) (1.710)
Leverage -0.141*** -0.126*** -0.106** -0.187*** -0.146*** -0.046** 0.009 -0.130***
(0.036) (0.032) (0.046) (0.054) (0.038) (0.022) (0.016) (0.033)
Deposit Ratio 3.074* 3.385* 2.525 2.984 3.749* 2.110*** -0.294 2.658*
(1.797) (2.021) (1.561) (2.079) (2.083) (0.779) (0.803) (1.545)
Cost Ratio 2.443 2.043 2.521 2.196 2.465 1.819*** -0.213 2.998**
(1.607) (1.998) (1.990) (1.895) (1.792) (0.628) (1.112) (1.331)
Loan/Assets 1.394 4.742 1.621 1.559 2.098 -0.657 0.507 0.764
(2.393) (2.955) (3.555) (3.070) (2.585) (1.259) (0.788) (2.149)
GDP per capita growth -0.014 -0.026** -0.012 -0.009 -0.014 -0.008* -0.003 -0.017*
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
Trade/GDP -0.020** -0.037*** -0.018* -0.021** -0.020** -0.006 -0.001 -0.018**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.001) (0.008)
HHI Loans -1.890 -5.014 -2.329 -2.764 -1.233 1.392 -3.642*** -2.622
(3.224) (3.462) (2.818) (4.224) (3.723) (1.867) (1.144) (2.705)
Country Equity/Assets -9.156** -9.543* -7.051 -11.355** -9.234* -4.176* 0.899 -7.077*
(4.315) (4.890) (5.845) (5.564) (4.714) (2.355) (1.877) (4.242)
Country Loan/Deposits -0.218* -0.483*** -0.235* -0.288* -0.259* -0.035 0.087 -0.163
(0.119) (0.163) (0.125) (0.156) (0.136) (0.072) (0.106) (0.112)
Property Rights Index -0.016** -0.031*** -0.014* -0.013 -0.013 -0.008* -0.003 -0.016**
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007)
Observations 9,498 9,498 9,498 9,498 9,498 9,498 9,498 9,498
Number of banks 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626
Serial correlation AR(1) 0.205 0.0958 0.384 0.203 0.124 0.0168 0.00377 0.329
Serial correlation AR(2) 0.834 0.454 0.952 0.624 0.502 0.739 0.286 0.892
Hansen test 0.126 0.177 0.103 0.347 0.211 0.0536 0.0941 0.0684
Note: This table presents the results of the System-GMM model after matching countries through propensity score
estimates. ROA and Equity Ratio are risk adjusted and in logarithm. The coefficients of the year dummies and the
constant were omitted for space considerations. The values of the serial correlation and Hansen tests are p-values.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: Impact of FC on banking stability
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z-score) Z-score decomposition
Baseline Size Liquidity Leverage HHI Higher risk ROA Equity ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FC -0.355*** -5.079*** -0.452 -1.649*** -0.629* -0.321*** -0.048 -0.342***
(0.125) (1.584) (0.337) (0.226) (0.364) (0.073) (0.086) (0.108)
FC · Xt — 0.336*** 0.385 0.135*** 1.511 -0.171** — —(0.107) (1.217) (0.019) (2.814) (0.068)
FC · Higher stability — — — — — 0.033 — —(0.049)
Higher risk — — — — — -1.047*** — —(0.143)
Higher stability — — — — — 0.917*** — —(0.094)
Ln(Yt−1) 0.199 0.185 0.249 0.142 -0.734 0.140 0.972*** 0.254
(0.274) (0.275) (0.257) (0.264) (0.916) (0.179) (0.160) (0.224)
Ln(Yt−2) -0.146 -0.035 -0.178 0.055 0.691 -0.172 -0.328** -0.180
(0.219) (0.191) (0.216) (0.206) (0.796) (0.163) (0.148) (0.162)
Size -0.219* -0.189 -0.242* -0.089 0.036 -0.170* -0.049 -0.203*
(0.132) (0.122) (0.137) (0.116) (0.313) (0.089) (0.072) (0.111)
Liquid Ratio 2.278 3.175* 1.640 2.766 0.236 2.119* 0.965 2.381
(1.707) (1.828) (1.801) (1.748) (1.783) (1.091) (0.823) (1.552)
Leverage -0.132*** -0.125*** -0.130*** -0.160*** -0.136*** -0.061*** -0.007 -0.128***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.038) (0.018) (0.013) (0.019)
Deposit Ratio 2.431 1.324 2.558 1.247 4.976* 1.578 0.063 2.260
(1.900) (1.587) (1.922) (1.603) (2.639) (1.209) (1.137) (1.646)
Cost Ratio 0.744 0.014 0.847 0.689 6.063 0.334 -1.050 0.820
(1.667) (1.651) (1.660) (1.617) (4.048) (1.102) (1.020) (1.503)
Loan/Assets 2.906* 3.822** 2.848* 3.348** 1.317 2.049* 0.455 2.355
(1.642) (1.806) (1.630) (1.572) (2.155) (1.134) (0.667) (1.454)
GDP per capita growth 0.041*** 0.034*** 0.041*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.004 0.034***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Trade/GDP -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.019 -0.006 0.007 -0.006
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.016) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010)
HHI Loans -5.961** -6.567*** -5.592** -6.272*** 0.020 -2.867 -4.069*** -5.876**
(2.448) (2.341) (2.355) (2.294) (3.198) (1.828) (1.405) (2.291)
Country Equity/Assets -16.108*** -13.576*** -15.851*** -14.978*** -8.083 -11.656*** -7.619*** -15.442***
(2.929) (2.760) (2.894) (2.674) (6.009) (2.159) (2.429) (2.836)
Country Loan/Deposits 0.030 -0.090 0.023 -0.083 0.182 0.083 0.065 0.025
(0.073) (0.080) (0.073) (0.072) (0.141) (0.056) (0.051) (0.066)
Property Rights Index 0.014 0.011 0.014 0.009 0.028** 0.013** -0.003 0.015
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Observations 13,891 13,891 13,891 13,891 13,891 13,891 13,891 13,891
Number of banks 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,200
Serial correlation AR(1) 0.372 0.484 0.256 0.580 0.850 0.000411 8.98e-06 0.175
Serial correlation AR(2) 0.874 0.327 0.985 0.222 0.299 0.644 0.119 0.916
Hansen test 0.220 0.230 0.200 0.243 0.124 0.0510 0.382 0.154
Note: This table presents the results of the System-GMM model after matching countries through propensity score
estimates. ROA and Equity Ratio are risk adjusted and in logarithm. The coefficients of the year dummies and the
constant were omitted for space considerations. The values of the serial correlation and Hansen tests are p-values.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12: Impact of LTV CAP on banking stability
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z-score) Z-score decomposition
Baseline Size Liquidity Leverage HHI Higher risk ROA Equity ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LTV CAP 0.121*** 0.948 -0.521** -0.538* -0.496 0.077*** 0.030 0.088**
(0.041) (1.670) (0.240) (0.277) (0.318) (0.029) (0.283) (0.037)
LTV CAP · Xt — -0.057 3.543*** 0.060** 5.002* 0.066 — —(0.116) (1.347) (0.027) (2.683) (0.064)
LTV CAP · Higher stability — — — — — -0.216*** — —(0.049)
Higher risk — — — — — -0.876*** — —(0.100)
Higher stability — — — — — 1.002*** — —(0.080)
Ln(Yt−1) 0.826*** 0.842*** 0.791*** 0.855*** 0.754*** 0.455*** 0.826*** 0.942***
(0.225) (0.226) (0.222) (0.227) (0.218) (0.168) (0.188) (0.223)
Ln(Yt−2) -0.372 -0.385 -0.326 -0.438* -0.296 -0.277 0.148 -0.333
(0.266) (0.268) (0.264) (0.266) (0.252) (0.179) (0.197) (0.249)
Size 0.107 0.107 0.070 0.096 0.106 0.118* -0.044 -0.041
(0.095) (0.113) (0.094) (0.095) (0.100) (0.062) (0.093) (0.092)
Liquid Ratio -6.527*** -6.672*** -6.995*** -6.071*** -6.973*** -3.825*** -2.075*** -4.704***
(0.939) (0.931) (1.042) (0.943) (1.057) (0.696) (0.789) (0.949)
Leverage -0.073*** -0.071*** -0.054** -0.086*** -0.063*** -0.043** 0.028* -0.050**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.028) (0.023) (0.018) (0.014) (0.022)
Deposit Ratio -4.930*** -4.949*** -5.349*** -4.620*** -5.419*** -2.706*** -3.976*** -3.788***
(1.023) (1.047) (1.059) (1.016) (1.048) (0.684) (1.316) (1.025)
Cost Ratio -2.731 -2.356 1.252 -3.044 -2.332 -9.394*** 2.284 7.098
(5.317) (5.463) (5.017) (5.274) (5.429) (3.546) (3.021) (5.651)
Loan/Assets -2.987* -3.088* -3.851** -2.975* -3.167* -0.841 -0.209 -4.814***
(1.729) (1.782) (1.604) (1.691) (1.772) (1.065) (0.589) (1.724)
GDP per capita growth 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.027** 0.033*** 0.026** 0.009 -0.011 0.026**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Trade/GDP 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.005*** -0.002 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.014) (0.003)
HHI Loans -7.456** -7.648** -7.484** -8.531*** -7.701** -4.415** 4.070* -5.960**
(2.918) (3.072) (2.988) (2.874) (3.219) (1.828) (2.289) (2.512)
Country Equity/Assets -15.941*** -16.193*** -16.516*** -15.943*** -15.795*** -8.943*** -0.859 -13.941***
(3.593) (3.549) (3.705) (3.696) (3.664) (2.358) (2.534) (3.074)
Country Loan/Deposits -0.605* -0.607* -0.499* -0.449 -0.773** -0.420** -0.910 -0.028
(0.317) (0.330) (0.303) (0.313) (0.330) (0.208) (0.599) (0.275)
Property Rights Index 0.007** 0.007* 0.009*** 0.007** 0.006* 0.004* 0.003 0.009**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 78,476 78,476 78,476 78,476 78,476 78,476 78,476 78,476
Number of banks 10,623 10,623 10,623 10,623 10,623 10,623 10,623 10,623
Serial correlation AR(1) 0.00945 0.00848 0.0125 0.00649 0.0130 0.00127 0.0474 0.00685
Serial correlation AR(2) 0.455 0.438 0.538 0.317 0.613 0.598 0.218 0.413
Hansen test 0.438 0.428 0.289 0.270 0.411 0.172 0.0665 0.156
Note: This table presents the results of the System-GMM model after matching countries through propensity score
estimates. ROA and Equity Ratio are risk adjusted and in logarithm. The coefficients of the year dummies and the
constant were omitted for space considerations. The values of the serial correlation and Hansen tests are p-values.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13: Impact of DTI on banking stability
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z-score) Z-score decomposition
Baseline Size Liquidity Leverage HHI Higher risk ROA Equity ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DTI 0.076 -4.456*** -0.827*** -0.767*** -0.952** 0.226** -0.012 0.040
(0.088) (1.354) (0.183) (0.214) (0.375) (0.111) (0.048) (0.090)
DTI · Xt — 0.310*** 4.565*** 0.078*** 9.107*** -0.137 — —(0.096) (0.850) (0.019) (3.185) (0.085)
DTI · Higher stability — — — — — -0.193** — —(0.086)
Higher risk — — — — — -0.985*** — —(0.201)
Higher stability — — — — — 0.967*** — —(0.165)
Ln(Yt−1) 0.385 0.411* 0.305 0.351 0.693*** 0.122 1.321*** 0.346
(0.243) (0.231) (0.252) (0.239) (0.268) (0.207) (0.237) (0.269)
Ln(Yt−2) 0.031 0.022 0.038 0.027 -0.320 -0.072 -0.310** 0.071
(0.199) (0.194) (0.200) (0.199) (0.217) (0.142) (0.136) (0.212)
Size -0.223* -0.212* -0.236* -0.199 -0.433*** -0.245*** 0.014 -0.149
(0.122) (0.112) (0.128) (0.123) (0.131) (0.092) (0.059) (0.132)
Liquid Ratio -3.460* -3.669** -3.513* -3.530** -2.901 -1.001 0.579 -3.316*
(1.792) (1.729) (1.803) (1.800) (1.914) (1.172) (1.086) (1.734)
Leverage -0.048*** -0.040** -0.053*** -0.045*** -0.062*** 0.000 -0.017 -0.043**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.013) (0.019)
Deposit Ratio -5.436*** -6.084*** -4.782*** -5.984*** -5.934*** -3.727*** -0.040 -4.748***
(1.194) (1.198) (1.313) (1.232) (1.349) (0.959) (0.794) (1.360)
Cost Ratio -3.929** -4.277** -3.485* -4.148** -7.591*** -2.682* -1.882* -2.446
(1.816) (1.824) (1.928) (1.851) (2.135) (1.559) (0.991) (2.066)
Loan/Assets 2.057 1.798 2.652* 2.479 3.128* 1.588 0.226 1.899
(1.550) (1.507) (1.502) (1.582) (1.746) (1.187) (0.745) (1.644)
GDP per capita growth 0.010* -0.003 0.007 0.003 0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
Trade/GDP 0.007** 0.005** 0.005* 0.006** 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.007***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
HHI Loans -4.637** -3.900* -5.129** -5.026** -5.931** -3.892** -0.654 -5.384**
(2.231) (2.177) (2.233) (2.342) (2.905) (1.682) (1.269) (2.243)
Country Equity/Assets -12.372*** -8.863*** -11.644*** -10.361*** -4.909 -7.282** -1.095 -11.617***
(2.164) (1.557) (2.161) (1.899) (4.440) (2.841) (1.601) (2.053)
Country Loan/Deposits -0.566*** -0.605*** -0.527*** -0.609*** -0.753*** -0.398*** 0.084 -0.481***
(0.128) (0.132) (0.142) (0.134) (0.128) (0.090) (0.111) (0.140)
Property Rights Index -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.004 -0.001 -0.013***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
Observations 14,070 14,070 14,070 14,070 14,070 14,070 14,070 14,070
Number of banks 2,225 2,225 2,225 2,225 2,225 2,225 2,225 2,225
Serial correlation AR(1) 0.0890 0.0605 0.128 0.0753 0.00547 0.00203 5.00e-05 0.165
Serial correlation AR(2) 0.123 0.114 0.148 0.110 0.612 0.0818 0.104 0.114
Hansen test 0.117 0.147 0.118 0.255 0.183 0.112 0.157 0.106
Note: This table presents the results of the System-GMM model after matching countries through propensity score
estimates. ROA and Equity Ratio are risk adjusted and in logarithm. The coefficients of the year dummies and the
constant were omitted for space considerations. The values of the serial correlation and Hansen tests are p-values.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 14: Impact of CONC on banking stability
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z-score) Z-score decomposition
Baseline Size Liquidity Leverage HHI Higher risk ROA Equity ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CONC 0.558*** -4.059** 1.926** -0.745 1.071*** 0.419*** 0.791** 0.796**
(0.206) (2.056) (0.851) (0.764) (0.399) (0.084) (0.357) (0.322)
CONC · Xt — 0.336** -6.300 0.111** -7.312 0.012 — —(0.150) (4.626) (0.055) (5.198) (0.037)
CONC · Higher stability — — — — — -0.110*** — —(0.035)
Higher risk — — — — — -0.608*** — —(0.098)
Higher stability — — — — — 0.730*** — —(0.075)
Ln(Yt−1) 0.960*** 0.705*** 0.985*** 0.404 0.978*** 0.880*** 0.471 0.484
(0.253) (0.184) (0.301) (0.292) (0.308) (0.195) (0.311) (0.469)
Ln(Yt−2) -0.300 -0.101 -0.308 0.111 -0.378 -0.361*** 0.013 0.176
(0.187) (0.148) (0.213) (0.217) (0.270) (0.137) (0.174) (0.309)
Size -0.158** -0.359*** -0.193*** -0.206** -0.171** -0.228*** 0.121* -0.081
(0.069) (0.139) (0.067) (0.094) (0.075) (0.045) (0.069) (0.123)
Liquid Ratio -5.869*** -2.964* 3.552 -2.890 -6.764*** -4.318*** -3.959*** -2.480
(1.079) (1.731) (4.803) (2.332) (2.502) (1.040) (1.507) (2.170)
Leverage -0.051*** -0.080*** -0.063*** -0.123** -0.044** -0.028** 0.054*** 0.003
(0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.058) (0.019) (0.014) (0.019) (0.032)
Deposit Ratio -3.485*** -2.288** -1.562* -3.878** -5.266*** -2.812*** -4.932*** -6.112***
(0.622) (1.081) (0.892) (1.832) (1.587) (0.563) (1.098) (2.333)
Cost Ratio 1.542 6.656*** 4.790** 5.665* 6.539*** 0.417 4.609*** 19.923***
(0.965) (1.868) (1.964) (3.118) (2.346) (0.788) (1.626) (3.040)
Loan/Assets -4.279*** -0.389 -1.863 -3.340** -1.918 -2.883*** -0.917 -0.393
(0.781) (1.275) (1.228) (1.501) (1.335) (0.641) (0.708) (1.217)
GDP per capita growth -0.007 -0.006 -0.021*** -0.018 0.006 -0.008** 0.018** 0.003
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.013)
Trade/GDP 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.006 0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006)
HHI Loans 2.744** -5.360* -2.553 -0.777 2.517 2.922*** -6.347* -8.084***
(1.222) (2.879) (3.755) (4.048) (5.667) (0.877) (3.495) (1.963)
Country Equity/Assets -11.127*** -13.258*** -12.129*** -8.767*** -18.154*** -8.813*** -8.976** -15.729***
(2.821) (3.538) (3.676) (3.311) (4.760) (2.525) (3.845) (3.818)
Country Loan/Deposits -0.429*** -0.480*** -0.390*** -0.607*** -0.743*** -0.373*** -0.310*** -1.409***
(0.117) (0.111) (0.113) (0.184) (0.167) (0.096) (0.101) (0.266)
Property Rights Index 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.014*** -0.001 0.001 0.011** 0.018**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009)
Observations 107,337 107,337 107,337 107,337 107,337 107,337 107,337 107,337
Number of banks 14,427 14,427 14,427 14,427 14,427 14,427 14,427 14,427
Serial correlation AR(1) 0.00571 0.00839 0.0126 0.384 0.0168 0.000122 0.188 0.326
Serial correlation AR(2) 0.273 0.954 0.320 0.368 0.410 0.0450 0.470 0.219
Hansen test 0.110 0.110 0.113 0.121 0.397 0.626 0.159 0.180
Note: This table presents the results of the System-GMM model after matching countries through propensity score
estimates. ROA and Equity Ratio are risk adjusted and in logarithm. The coefficients of the year dummies and the
constant were omitted for space considerations. The values of the serial correlation and Hansen tests are p-values.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 15: Impact of INTER on banking stability
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z-score) Z-score decomposition
Baseline Size Liquidity Leverage HHI Higher risk ROA Equity ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
INTER 0.417** -1.318 1.197 -0.184 0.251 0.352*** 0.495** 0.364**
(0.176) (2.187) (0.919) (1.201) (0.281) (0.126) (0.241) (0.175)
INTER · Xt — 0.106 -3.473 0.022 1.750 -0.166** — —(0.137) (4.062) (0.047) (4.386) (0.077)
INTER · Higher stability — — — — — -0.166*** — —(0.062)
Higher risk — — — — — -0.715*** — —(0.124)
Higher stability — — — — — 0.974*** — —(0.100)
Ln(Yt−1) 0.635* 0.636* 0.312 0.564 0.739** 0.517** 0.550*** 0.748***
(0.348) (0.372) (0.566) (0.401) (0.370) (0.231) (0.203) (0.275)
Ln(Yt−2) -0.116 -0.130 0.163 -0.092 -0.118 -0.209 0.114 -0.126
(0.284) (0.300) (0.477) (0.341) (0.291) (0.168) (0.140) (0.223)
Size -0.160 -0.213 -0.136 -0.126 -0.237** -0.162*** 0.008 -0.184*
(0.104) (0.182) (0.121) (0.124) (0.113) (0.063) (0.042) (0.109)
Liquid Ratio -8.619*** -8.932*** -5.908 -8.585*** -6.028** -5.212*** -3.280*** -8.147***
(1.862) (2.232) (3.756) (2.312) (2.632) (1.423) (1.110) (1.815)
Leverage -0.017 -0.026 0.003 -0.032 -0.018 -0.010 0.060*** 0.007
(0.021) (0.021) (0.035) (0.023) (0.021) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021)
Deposit Ratio -6.824*** -7.707*** -8.012*** -8.101*** -6.396*** -3.403*** -5.004*** -7.496***
(1.731) (2.074) (2.525) (3.095) (1.959) (1.116) (1.004) (1.768)
Cost Ratio 4.404** 4.338** 4.294* 4.836** 13.132*** 1.136 6.688*** 6.485***
(1.999) (2.200) (2.319) (2.195) (4.150) (1.172) (2.276) (1.890)
Loan/Assets -4.968*** -4.565*** -5.046*** -4.682*** -2.650* -3.010*** -1.235** -4.205***
(0.992) (1.049) (1.187) (1.090) (1.358) (0.648) (0.602) (1.023)
GDP per capita growth -0.009 0.001 -0.023 -0.000 -0.003 -0.008 0.007* -0.014
(0.012) (0.008) (0.022) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.011)
Trade/GDP 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.002** 0.013***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
HHI Loans 4.730** 3.583 5.361** 3.871 -1.914 4.734*** -2.727* 2.962
(1.896) (2.611) (2.349) (2.982) (6.471) (1.189) (1.632) (1.894)
Country Equity/Assets -6.129 -7.635 -5.398 -5.708 -11.103** -3.902 -8.135** -6.286
(4.088) (4.665) (4.840) (4.743) (4.534) (2.765) (3.184) (4.449)
Country Loan/Deposits -1.047*** -1.160** -1.306** -1.134* -1.360*** -0.440* -0.614*** -1.365***
(0.345) (0.479) (0.526) (0.613) (0.377) (0.234) (0.130) (0.350)
Property Rights Index 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.001
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008)
Observations 105,084 105,084 105,084 105,084 105,084 105,084 105,084 105,084
Number of banks 14,115 14,115 14,115 14,115 14,115 14,115 14,115 14,115
Serial correlation AR(1) 0.133 0.135 0.588 0.204 0.114 0.0137 0.0610 0.0309
Serial correlation AR(2) 0.906 0.917 0.540 0.851 0.875 0.664 0.126 0.883
Hansen test 0.126 0.115 0.117 0.117 0.282 0.0517 0.0642 0.228
Note: This table presents the results of the System-GMM model after matching countries through propensity score
estimates. ROA and Equity Ratio are risk adjusted and in logarithm. The coefficients of the year dummies and the
constant were omitted for space considerations. The values of the serial correlation and Hansen tests are p-values.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 16: Impact of TAX on banking stability
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z-score) Z-score decomposition
Baseline Size Liquidity Leverage HHI Higher risk ROA Equity ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TAX 0.555 0.180 -1.406 1.448* 1.560** -0.053 0.297 0.400
(0.367) (3.330) (2.280) (0.875) (0.626) (0.211) (0.279) (0.289)
TAX · Xt — 0.051 16.113 -0.070 -11.763*** -0.152 — —(0.254) (18.485) (0.045) (4.373) (0.118)
TAX · Higher stability — — — — — -0.173 — —(0.137)
Higher risk — — — — — -1.244*** — —(0.275)
Higher stability — — — — — 1.371*** — —(0.221)
Ln(Yt−1) -0.352 -0.335 0.391 -0.017 -0.064 -0.497 0.765 0.041
(0.774) (0.996) (1.496) (0.619) (0.637) (0.441) (0.503) (0.611)
Ln(Yt−2) 0.730 0.674 -0.124 0.475 0.519 0.290 -0.058 0.436
(0.503) (0.560) (1.155) (0.362) (0.396) (0.320) (0.384) (0.478)
Size 0.323*** 0.295** 0.154 0.200** 0.414*** 0.135* 0.111 0.267**
(0.104) (0.127) (0.256) (0.088) (0.115) (0.071) (0.111) (0.121)
Liquid Ratio -1.269 -0.398 -6.088 -1.286 -1.040 1.307 0.947 -1.501
(3.502) (3.960) (7.476) (3.428) (3.332) (1.887) (1.037) (2.305)
Leverage -0.090*** -0.083*** -0.067* -0.083*** -0.074*** -0.005 -0.026** -0.083***
(0.020) (0.028) (0.037) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023) (0.013) (0.016)
Deposit Ratio 1.368 1.439 -1.954 -0.064 1.614 0.554 0.466 -0.147
(2.985) (3.211) (5.593) (2.448) (2.542) (2.153) (1.806) (2.769)
Cost Ratio -2.342 5.424 -19.354 4.298 -2.571 4.133 -14.857 -4.917
(13.540) (16.256) (31.027) (13.861) (10.517) (9.446) (9.856) (10.884)
Loan/Assets 1.553 2.067 -0.208 1.093 2.096 3.110** 0.754 1.363
(2.577) (2.818) (4.666) (2.364) (2.441) (1.375) (0.812) (1.880)
GDP per capita growth -0.030 -0.023 -0.057 -0.013 -0.057** 0.015 -0.035 -0.030*
(0.022) (0.030) (0.057) (0.022) (0.024) (0.015) (0.022) (0.016)
Trade/GDP -0.001 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.002 -0.000 -0.008* -0.001
(0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
HHI Loans -0.582 0.364 -0.891 -0.244 1.485 -1.084 -1.613 -1.562
(2.354) (3.264) (3.892) (2.209) (2.604) (1.576) (1.578) (2.266)
Country Equity/Assets -1.075 -6.705 0.211 -10.670 -17.688 -11.253** 8.865 -0.542
(8.332) (10.217) (14.773) (10.561) (19.492) (5.247) (6.441) (5.539)
Country Loan/Deposits -1.492** -1.210 -1.218 -1.029 -0.679 -0.671 -1.040* -1.426**
(0.678) (0.815) (1.221) (0.637) (0.909) (0.530) (0.620) (0.596)
Property Rights Index 0.019* 0.018 -0.000 0.012 0.003 0.018** 0.009 0.015
(0.011) (0.014) (0.028) (0.009) (0.018) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Observations 28,498 28,498 28,498 28,498 28,498 28,498 28,498 28,498
Number of banks 3,578 3,578 3,578 3,578 3,578 3,578 3,578 3,578
Serial correlation AR(1) 0.881 0.907 0.761 0.965 0.967 0.0104 0.295 0.999
Serial correlation AR(2) 0.121 0.203 0.998 0.155 0.172 0.102 0.990 0.295
Hansen test 0.113 0.204 0.537 0.145 0.130 0.322 0.0980 0.0797
Note: This table presents the results of the System-GMM model after matching countries through propensity score
estimates. ROA and Equity Ratio are risk adjusted and in logarithm. The coefficients of the year dummies and the
constant were omitted for space considerations. The values of the serial correlation and Hansen tests are p-values.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 17: Impact of capital-based instruments on banking stability
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z-score) Z-score decomposition
Baseline Size Liquidity Leverage HHI Higher risk ROA Equity ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Capital 0.034 3.674 -1.331*** -2.401** -0.429*** 0.062 0.296 -0.140
(0.214) (4.726) (0.494) (1.170) (0.141) (0.138) (0.522) (0.236)
Capital · Xt — -0.259 8.391*** 0.161** 2.682 0.017 — —(0.331) (2.596) (0.079) (2.032) (0.078)
Capital · Higher stability — — — — — -0.035 — —(0.047)
Higher risk — — — — — -0.943*** — —(0.260)
Higher stability — — — — — 0.966*** — —(0.179)
Ln(Yt−1) 0.659 0.470 1.156** 1.249*** 1.126*** 0.333 2.596** 1.145***
(0.509) (0.580) (0.558) (0.427) (0.236) (0.401) (1.303) (0.401)
Ln(Yt−2) 0.011 0.087 -0.327 -0.502 -0.315* -0.001 -1.158 -0.290
(0.399) (0.392) (0.426) (0.343) (0.186) (0.261) (0.821) (0.312)
Size -0.116 0.055 -0.264** -0.283** -0.115 -0.135* -0.654 -0.219*
(0.103) (0.269) (0.126) (0.110) (0.075) (0.071) (0.544) (0.125)
Liquid Ratio -9.544*** -11.532*** -10.607*** -6.907*** -6.567*** -7.002*** 1.089 -7.135***
(2.380) (3.933) (2.499) (2.254) (1.509) (1.790) (4.478) (2.133)
Leverage 0.055 0.103 -0.003 -0.150 -0.010 0.075 -0.251 0.019
(0.069) (0.106) (0.064) (0.097) (0.024) (0.050) (0.230) (0.069)
Deposit Ratio -10.887*** -14.083** -9.256*** -4.714 -4.497*** -8.383*** 6.200 -8.176**
(3.366) (5.976) (3.098) (3.357) (1.123) (2.049) (8.080) (3.182)
Cost Ratio 16.567** 15.953* 21.461*** 3.445 3.744** 9.222** -6.948 15.152**
(7.610) (8.673) (8.217) (7.292) (1.901) (4.570) (11.066) (7.316)
Loan/Assets -2.624 -4.335 -1.372 -2.470* -2.512*** -2.168* -1.706 -1.294
(1.721) (3.127) (1.885) (1.287) (0.910) (1.231) (2.142) (1.402)
GDP per capita growth 0.023** 0.035* 0.014* 0.003 0.008* 0.019*** -0.075 0.014
(0.010) (0.020) (0.009) (0.012) (0.004) (0.007) (0.068) (0.010)
Trade/GDP 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.003 0.004*** 0.004** 0.033 0.006***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.028) (0.002)
HHI Loans -6.144 -5.712 -7.251 4.437 -0.372 -3.179 17.832 -3.336
(4.854) (5.317) (4.966) (5.438) (2.296) (2.811) (17.657) (4.789)
Country Equity/Assets -16.528*** -14.335** -20.033*** -19.649*** -7.242** -10.192** -13.102 -17.315***
(5.288) (6.912) (5.826) (4.312) (3.445) (4.036) (9.762) (4.581)
Country Loan/Deposits -1.650*** -1.659** -1.922*** -1.113** -0.625*** -1.040*** -0.131 -1.584***
(0.576) (0.676) (0.624) (0.433) (0.216) (0.377) (0.453) (0.524)
Property Rights Index 0.005 0.008 0.005 -0.000 -0.001 0.007 -0.022 0.001
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.021) (0.006)
Observations 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006
Number of banks 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508
Serial correlation AR(1) 0.161 0.163 0.0668 0.0221 0.00115 0.0741 0.113 0.0182
Serial correlation AR(2) 0.503 0.370 0.942 0.384 0.302 0.306 0.196 0.925
Hansen test 0.0911 0.213 0.277 0.281 0.0945 0.245 0.627 0.0542
Note: This table presents the results of the System-GMM model after matching countries through propensity score
estimates. ROA and Equity Ratio are risk adjusted and in logarithm. The coefficients of the year dummies and the
constant were omitted for space considerations. The values of the serial correlation and Hansen tests are p-values.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 18: Impact of asset-based instruments on banking stability
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z-score) Z-score decomposition
Baseline Size Liquidity Leverage HHI Higher risk ROA Equity ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Asset -0.430*** -6.019** -2.019*** -1.333*** -0.963* -0.269** -0.131 -0.594**
(0.162) (2.345) (0.485) (0.514) (0.519) (0.112) (0.175) (0.260)
Asset · Xt — 0.393** 5.849*** 0.087** 4.672 -0.306*** — —(0.158) (1.785) (0.039) (3.828) (0.109)
Asset · Higher stability — — — — — -0.215** — —(0.086)
Higher risk — — — — — -0.932*** — —(0.199)
Higher stability — — — — — 0.971*** — —(0.150)
Ln(Yt−1) 0.849* 0.898* 0.758** 0.909* 0.995** 0.298 0.710** 0.390
(0.472) (0.480) (0.357) (0.481) (0.420) (0.358) (0.352) (0.447)
Ln(Yt−2) -0.126 -0.186 -0.187 -0.180 -0.228 0.025 -0.027 0.111
(0.403) (0.413) (0.279) (0.413) (0.346) (0.249) (0.236) (0.337)
Size -0.168 -0.212 -0.116 -0.190 -0.186 -0.111* 0.050 -0.011
(0.129) (0.142) (0.096) (0.134) (0.123) (0.066) (0.073) (0.125)
Liquid Ratio -9.511*** -9.609*** -9.665*** -9.488*** -10.116*** -6.677*** -7.832** -10.726***
(2.574) (2.609) (2.141) (2.573) (2.771) (1.807) (3.243) (3.695)
Leverage 0.063 0.065 -0.008 0.058 0.067 0.070* 0.059* 0.001
(0.067) (0.068) (0.030) (0.068) (0.067) (0.041) (0.031) (0.045)
Deposit Ratio -10.358*** -10.689*** -8.593*** -10.395*** -10.325*** -7.707*** -6.604*** -8.232**
(3.126) (3.213) (1.861) (3.129) (3.207) (1.818) (2.364) (3.203)
Cost Ratio 15.648* 15.927* 6.548 15.631* 14.192* 9.369** 0.992 3.369
(8.563) (8.671) (4.752) (8.570) (7.323) (4.411) (1.791) (2.534)
Loan/Assets -2.743* -2.609 -4.358*** -2.559 -3.212** -1.968* -1.945 -2.252
(1.664) (1.692) (1.331) (1.691) (1.592) (1.184) (1.232) (1.627)
GDP per capita growth 0.022** 0.021* 0.009 0.021* 0.020* 0.017*** 0.008 -0.015
(0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012) (0.021)
Trade/GDP 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.004** 0.002 0.017**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008)
HHI Loans -4.939 -4.459 1.836 -4.313 -3.431 -3.478 -2.009 -7.075**
(5.009) (5.030) (3.162) (5.065) (4.021) (2.524) (2.608) (2.928)
Country Equity/Assets -15.221*** -16.198*** -6.753 -16.044*** -14.239*** -8.925** -5.188 -7.877
(5.450) (5.703) (5.413) (5.743) (5.465) (4.072) (3.981) (6.204)
Country Loan/Deposits -1.662*** -1.763*** -1.198*** -1.716*** -1.608*** -1.024*** -0.688** -1.361***
(0.609) (0.636) (0.348) (0.614) (0.588) (0.358) (0.327) (0.444)
Property Rights Index 0.001 -0.000 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 -0.005 -0.015
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009)
Observations 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006
Number of banks 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508
Serial correlation AR(1) 0.0964 0.0836 0.0595 0.0852 0.0431 0.0686 0.0780 0.229
Serial correlation AR(2) 0.762 0.848 0.987 0.848 0.932 0.261 0.628 0.332
Hansen test 0.112 0.149 0.111 0.120 0.103 0.225 0.0666 0.0684
Note: This table presents the results of the System-GMM model after matching countries through propensity score
estimates. ROA and Equity Ratio are risk adjusted and in logarithm. The coefficients of the year dummies and the
constant were omitted for space considerations. The values of the serial correlation and Hansen tests are p-values.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 19: Impact of borrower-based instruments on banking stability
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z-score) Z-score decomposition
Baseline Size Liquidity Leverage HHI Higher risk ROA Equity ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Borrower 0.607* 0.675 -0.639 0.438 -0.058 0.419** 0.088 0.073
(0.322) (1.895) (0.482) (0.707) (0.358) (0.208) (0.115) (0.227)
Borrower · Xt — -0.006 6.690** 0.012 3.487 -0.113* — —(0.125) (3.054) (0.046) (4.460) (0.066)
Borrower · Higher stability — — — — — -0.228*** — —(0.061)
Higher risk — — — — — -0.938*** — —(0.216)
Higher stability — — — — — 0.966*** — —(0.162)
Ln(Yt−1) 0.600 0.657 0.738 0.645 1.028** 0.306 0.711** 0.408
(0.501) (0.469) (0.506) (0.489) (0.437) (0.384) (0.360) (0.465)
Ln(Yt−2) 0.054 0.002 0.022 0.007 -0.256 0.018 -0.029 0.106
(0.410) (0.389) (0.422) (0.403) (0.357) (0.266) (0.242) (0.347)
Size -0.149 -0.163 -0.171 -0.160 -0.231* -0.155* 0.044 -0.038
(0.117) (0.117) (0.136) (0.120) (0.135) (0.081) (0.075) (0.133)
Liquid Ratio -9.986*** -9.833*** -9.992*** -9.770*** -10.463*** -7.232*** -8.053** -11.123***
(2.586) (2.638) (3.181) (2.597) (3.003) (1.940) (3.397) (3.882)
Leverage 0.069 0.060 0.097 0.056 0.059 0.079* 0.062* 0.008
(0.066) (0.066) (0.088) (0.065) (0.068) (0.047) (0.033) (0.048)
Deposit Ratio -11.750*** -11.496*** -11.562*** -11.426*** -10.617*** -8.681*** -6.888*** -9.062***
(3.354) (3.310) (4.178) (3.110) (3.448) (2.171) (2.589) (3.458)
Cost Ratio 17.771** 17.303** 17.891* 17.112** 11.817* 9.477** 0.967 3.477
(7.873) (7.818) (9.974) (7.211) (6.498) (4.794) (1.754) (2.544)
Loan/Assets -3.129* -3.032* -3.227* -3.017* -3.776** -2.445** -2.045 -2.371
(1.719) (1.654) (1.789) (1.696) (1.536) (1.187) (1.297) (1.746)
GDP per capita growth 0.021** 0.021* 0.017 0.020** 0.017* 0.017** 0.009 -0.014
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.020)
Trade/GDP 0.006** 0.006*** 0.005** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003* 0.002 0.017**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008)
HHI Loans -6.881 -6.518 -5.199 -6.434 -1.761 -3.205 -2.068 -6.846**
(4.569) (4.485) (5.465) (4.199) (3.628) (2.713) (2.723) (3.227)
Country Equity/Assets -16.343*** -17.217*** -13.312** -17.272*** -15.103*** -9.766** -5.314 -8.747
(5.857) (5.707) (5.940) (6.255) (5.695) (4.526) (3.920) (6.175)
Country Loan/Deposits -1.758*** -1.740*** -1.748** -1.726*** -1.530** -1.082*** -0.693** -1.381***
(0.620) (0.614) (0.751) (0.569) (0.598) (0.403) (0.336) (0.458)
Property Rights Index 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.000 0.009 -0.004 -0.011
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Observations 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006
Number of banks 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508
Serial correlation AR(1) 0.165 0.126 0.148 0.149 0.0502 0.0714 0.0787 0.215
Serial correlation AR(2) 0.425 0.480 0.541 0.486 0.974 0.260 0.629 0.325
Hansen test 0.120 0.108 0.0702 0.113 0.0889 0.298 0.0682 0.0821
Note: This table presents the results of the System-GMM model after matching countries through propensity score esti-
mates. ROA and Equity Ratio are risk adjusted and in logarithm. The coefficients of the year dummies and the constant
were omitted for space considerations. The values of the serial correlation and Hansen tests are p-values. Standard errors
are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 20: Impact of structural-based instruments on banking stability
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z-score) Z-score decomposition
Baseline Size Liquidity Leverage HHI Higher risk ROA Equity ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Structural 0.352** 1.113 -0.984 0.636 0.324 0.413*** -0.076*** -0.078**
(0.177) (5.165) (1.286) (0.515) (0.570) (0.132) (0.029) (0.033)
Structural · Xt — -0.054 5.733 -0.023 0.258 -0.006 — —(0.363) (5.429) (0.040) (5.605) (0.049)
Structural · Higher stability — — — — — -0.102** — —(0.041)
Higher risk — — — — — -0.520*** — —(0.116)
Higher stability — — — — — 0.681*** — —(0.100)
Ln(Yt−1) 1.150*** 1.156*** 1.064*** 1.233*** 1.151*** 0.931*** 1.105*** 0.948***
(0.277) (0.285) (0.324) (0.332) (0.333) (0.234) (0.141) (0.132)
Ln(Yt−2) -0.421* -0.429* -0.389 -0.490* -0.424* -0.376** -0.241** -0.154
(0.228) (0.238) (0.257) (0.275) (0.258) (0.169) (0.110) (0.105)
Size -0.225** -0.177 -0.178 -0.233** -0.224** -0.218*** 0.013 0.033
(0.096) (0.334) (0.116) (0.102) (0.103) (0.069) (0.038) (0.047)
Liquid Ratio -9.081*** -9.052*** -15.888** -9.871*** -9.018*** -6.090*** -3.455*** -4.473***
(2.236) (2.253) (6.889) (2.700) (2.326) (2.034) (0.717) (0.913)
Leverage -0.037* -0.036 -0.041* -0.018 -0.037* -0.028* 0.002 -0.004
(0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.038) (0.021) (0.015) (0.011) (0.017)
Deposit Ratio -5.891*** -5.877*** -6.847*** -6.312*** -5.864*** -3.947*** -2.673*** -3.758***
(1.674) (1.682) (2.037) (1.891) (1.639) (1.437) (0.456) (0.567)
Cost Ratio 1.130 1.037 1.020 0.732 1.089 0.287 1.920** 1.704*
(1.587) (1.723) (1.687) (1.820) (1.605) (1.177) (0.837) (1.013)
Loan/Assets -5.025*** -4.972*** -4.416*** -5.026*** -4.993*** -3.800*** -0.483 -1.192*
(1.270) (1.341) (1.509) (1.328) (1.347) (0.992) (0.478) (0.659)
GDP per capita growth -0.010 -0.011 0.004 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 0.003 0.004
(0.011) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003)
Trade/GDP 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
HHI Loans 5.069** 5.080** 1.824 4.618* 4.703 5.534*** -1.521* -1.755*
(2.278) (2.298) (4.058) (2.523) (8.090) (1.610) (0.877) (1.007)
Country Equity/Assets -12.611*** -12.399*** -12.887*** -13.492*** -12.583*** -9.805*** -5.185*** -5.353***
(3.951) (4.193) (4.421) (4.472) (4.503) (3.229) (1.514) (1.683)
Country Loan/Deposits -0.791*** -0.794*** -0.891*** -0.864*** -0.786*** -0.483** -0.301*** -0.336***
(0.280) (0.282) (0.313) (0.317) (0.270) (0.236) (0.068) (0.083)
Property Rights Index -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 -0.008 -0.005 0.001 -0.002 -0.000
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006 108,006
Number of banks 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508
Serial correlation AR(1) 0.00271 0.00330 0.00740 0.00670 0.00982 0.00115 3.08e-07 4.68e-06
Serial correlation AR(2) 0.259 0.265 0.528 0.249 0.298 0.124 0.181 0.644
Hansen test 0.169 0.0984 0.240 0.144 0.0764 0.201 0.0841 0.0700
Note: This table presents the results of the System-GMM model after matching countries through propensity score esti-
mates. ROA and Equity Ratio are risk adjusted and in logarithm. The coefficients of the year dummies and the constant
were omitted for space considerations. The values of the serial correlation and Hansen tests are p-values. Standard errors
are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
55
